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AUGMENTING ADVOCACY: GIVING VOICE TO THE
MEDICAL-LEGAL PARTNERSHIP MODEL IN MEDICAID
PROCEEDINGS AND BEYOND
MaryBeth Musumeci*
The denial of Medicaid coverage for augmentative communication devices, despite
an existing legal framework that mandates the opposite result, raises fundamental
questions about what independence means for people with disabilities. This situa-
tion, compounded by the barriers in the Medicaid administrative appeal process
encountered by such beneficiaries, invites new approaches to the delivery of civil le-
gal services, such as medical-legal partnerships (MLPs). MLPs are formalized
arrangements that bring lawyers into a healthcare setting to provide specialist con-
sultations when patients experience legal problems that affect health. While there is
an emerging scholarship on MLPs, this Article offers the first in-depth analysis of
a particular area of the law-Medicaid advocacy for people with disabilities-in
the context of the MLP model. Part I explores legal and public policy justifications
for Medicaid coverage of services that promote independence for people with disa-
bilities, such as augmentative communication devices. Part II describes the
Medicaid administrative hearing process and the barriers it presents to people with
disabilities who appeal the denial of a service, including augmentative communi-
cation devices. Part III summarizes existing scholarship about MLPs. Part IV
applies the MLP model to the problems typically encountered by Medicaid benefi-
ciaries in the appeals process. The Article concludes by recommending some
refinements to increase the acceptance of this new legal services delivery model.
INTRODUCTION
When her parents requested legal assistance, Sonya was a young
adult with cerebral palsy and mental retardation that completely
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foreclosed any natural ability to generate speech.' To overcome her
communication deficits, Sonya's doctor prescribed an augmenta-
tive communication device.2 This technology would enable her to
express basic needs, such as hunger, thirst, and having to use the
bathroom; describe physical and medical needs, such as pain and
whether something is too hot or too cold; and call for assistance,
both in and out of her wheelchair.
Sonya's doctor and speech-language pathologist went through a
painstaking process of evaluating the suitability of five different
devices for her. She required a device that was large enough to ac-
commodate her somewhat limited motor skills, but also small
enough to be portable and durable. A dynamic screen would en-
sure that her vocabulary would be large and expandable, and
would allow her to operate the device independently with a finger
touch. An integrated speaker would allow her to adjust the device's
volume as appropriate for different environments. Sonya's device
also needed to be user-friendly to facilitate vocabulary updates and
to ensure that those unfamiliar with the device would find it easy to
operate.
The Medicaid managed care organization (MCO)3 that adminis-
tered Sonya's healthcare benefits, however, denied authorization
for the prescription. Relying on Sonya's home state's definition of
"Medicaid medical necessity," the MCO determined that an aug-
mentative communication device was not the least expensive
1. After she turned eighteen, Sonya's parents were appointed as her legal guardians.
Sonya's name and other identifying details have been changed to protect confidentiality.
For a general discussion of client consent with respect to publishing stories about cases, see
Binny Miller, Telling Stories About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 1 (2000).
2. Augmentative and alternative communication is defined as "an area of clinical
practice that attempts to compensate (either temporarily or permanently) for the impair-
ment and disability patterns of individuals with severe expressive communication disorders
(i.e., the severe impairments in speech-language, reading and writing)." Frequently Asked
Questions about Augmentative and Alternative Communication, Am. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING
Ass'N, http://www.asha.org/NJC/faqs-aac-basics.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). Some ex-
amples of augmentative communication devices include communication boards or books,
electrolarynexes, speech amplifiers, and electronic devices that produce speech or written
output. Id.
3. With limited exceptions for certain beneficiary populations, states may elect to
administer their Medicaid program through a managed care system. See 42 1).S C. § 1396us-2
(2006) (authorization of states to use managed care systems); 42 C.F.R. Part 438 (2009)
(regulations covering such systems). While the Medicaid program traditionally uses a fee-for-
service model, in which providers are paid for each service performed, the alternative
managed care model offers a capitated rate, a fixed sum paid regardless of the amount of
services utilized. See Deborah M. Chasan-Sloan, Note, Managed Care, the Poor, and the Constitu-
tion: Are Due Process Rights Ailing under Medicaid Managed Care?, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL'Y 283, 286-87 (2001) (describing the rise of Medicaid managed care).
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appropriate medical care available for Sonya. Without identifying
any other alternative, the MCO also alleged that the device was not
the most appropriate option for Sonya and instead was duplicative
of other, unspecified, services that the MCO alleged she received.
Sonya's father appealed the MCO's denial, which afforded Sonya
an informal hearing at the health plan's office. The hearing panel
included an MCO representative who had not been involved in the
initial decision, a representative from the state Medicaid agency,
and another Medicaid program beneficiary. At the hearing, the
MCO nurse case manager who was responsible for Sonya's case de-
fended the denial by asserting that Sonya's natural communication
abilities could adequately meet her daily needs without an aug-
mentative communication device. She maintained that because
Sonya had the ability to grunt, groan, and bang on things, Sonya
could get someone's attention in an emergency if she were in a
room alone. Thus, the case manager asserted, Sonya could com-
municate basic needs without an augmentative communication
device, and the Medicaid program did not have to provide her with
6
a more extensive or sophisticated means of communication.
At the hearing, Sonya's father described what having the device
would mean for Sonya. He told the panel members that what he
most wanted was for Sonya to live like a typical teenager, to the
greatest extent possible. He wanted her to have privacy and to be
able to spend time in her room without needing someone con-
stantly with her. He also wanted her to be able to experience some
of the independence associated with young adulthood. Most of all,
he wanted to be able to communicate with his daughter so that he
could understand what she was thinking and feeling. The diamet-
rically opposing views about what Sonya's capabilities should be, as
expressed by the MCO case manager and her father, were striking.
The hearing ended, and the next day, Sonya received a brief letter
indicating that the device was approved, over four months after her
doctor wrote the prescription. The hearing panel did not share its
reasoning for the reversal.
Sonya's case is not unique. The initial response of this particular
state's Medicaid program to Sonya's need for an augmentative
communication device is representative of how the program often
fails in practice to meet the needs of people with disabilities,
4. The specific regulation has been paraphrased to protect client confidentiality. See
Miller, supra note 1, at 49, 50.
5. Such a process is required by Federal Medicaid law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(b) (4)
(2006) (outlining basic grievance procedures for challenging a denial); 42 C.F.R.
§ 438.406(b) (2) (2009).
6. This information is based on my representation of Sonya at that hearing.
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despite an existing legal framework that mandates the opposite
result. While Sonya ultimately obtained the device prescribed by
her doctor, many others are not so fortunate; they typically wait
even longer and often are unable to overcome the barriers de-
scribed in Part II, infra, and thus cannot obtain medically necessary
devices.
While Sonya's story involves access to augmentative communica-
tion devices, the Medicaid program covers a wide array of medical
services, including, inter alia, inpatient and outpatient hospitaliza-
tion, laboratory tests, home health services, and physical therapy
and related services.! While this Article focuses on Medicaid cover-
age of augmentative communication devices,' its observations
about the obstacles faced by Sonya and thousands of other persons
with disabilities in accessing such treatment are generally applica-
ble to all types of Medicaid service claims.
These obstacles raise fundamental questions about what inde-
pendence means for people with disabilities: What does it mean to
communicate a basic need?9 Who determines which needs are
basic? What amount of communication is adequate? If technology
exists to augment communication, should a person's natural ability
to communicate limit her self-expression? Who should have access
to this technology, and how should it be funded? Such questions
are important for the "approximately two million people [in the
United States today] who are able to hear but have little to no usa-
ble speech."'o
Reforming the Medicaid appeals process itself is potentially one
way to remedy these problems. However, reconceptualizing the
traditional model within which civil legal services are delivered to
Medicaid beneficiaries presents another, less obvious alternative
that can more effectively address issues arising from the Medicaid
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006) (defining the "medical assistance" provided under
Medicaid).
8. See generally Diane C. Bristow, Breaking Down the Barriers to Communication through
Medicare Reform, 29 Sw. U. L. REV. 357 (2000) (focusing on Medicare funding of augmenta-
tive communication devices); Ellen M. Saideman, Helping the Mute to Speak: The Availability of
Augmentative Communication Devices under Medicaid, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 741
(1990) (arguing that the Medicaid medical necessity standard entitles recipients to aug-
mentative communication devices that provide unlimited speech).
9. "Communication" is generally defined as "any act-by which one person gives to or
receives from another person information about that person's needs, desires, perceptions,
knowledge, or effective states." Guidelines for Meeting the Communication Needs of Persons with
Severe Disabilities, Am. SPEECH-LANGUAGE- HEARING Ass'N, http://www.asha.org/
docs/html/GLl992-00201.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Guidelines].
10. DATI Assistive Technology Facts: Augmentative and Alternative Communication, DEL. As-
SISTIVE TECH. INITIATIVE, http://www.dati.org/info/acc.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2011). See
also Guidelines, supra note 9.
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appeals process." This Article explores the medical-legal partner-
ship model as one such solution and seeks to add to the
developing scholarship in this area." Specifically, establishing, fos-
tering, and formalizing the working relationships between legal
advocates and treating physicians on behalf of their common cli-
ents and patients in medical-legal partnerships presents an
efficient and effective means of overcoming the problems present-
ed in Medicaid service denial appeals. Like Sonya's need for
augmentative communication, lawyers for people with disabilities
also benefit from augmenting their advocacy through partnering
with doctors. While there is an emerging scholarship on medical-
legal partnerships, this Article offers the first in-depth analysis of a
particular area of the law-Medicaid advocacy for people with dis-
abilities-in the context of the medical-legal partnership model. 3
This analysis impacts a sizeable population. The Medicaid pro-
gram insures one in seven Americans-more than 40 million
people." While it is typically thought of as a benefit for people with
low incomes, Medicaid also is a valuable source of primary or sup-
plemental health insurance coverage for people with disabilities. In
fact, "Medicaid is the single largest source of health care financ-
ing-public or private"-for low-income people with disabilities.'5
For people with disabilities who cannot work, Medicaid may be the
only accessible coverage.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See, e.g., Pamela Tames et al., The Lawyer Is In: Why Some Doctors Are Prescribing Legal
Remedies for Their Patients, and How the Legal Profession Can Support This Effort, 12 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 505 (2003) (exploring ethical and confidentiality issues arising in multi-disciplinary
practice); Barry Zuckerman et al., Why Pediatricians Need Lawyers to Keep Children Healthy, 114
PEDIATRICS 224 (2004) (suggesting potential benefits of placing lawyers in pediatric clinics).
13. The views and recommendations expressed in this Article for improving the legal
services delivery model are informed by my advocacy in hundreds of Medicaid cases during
my tenure at a legal services program.
14. ANDY SCHNEIDER ET AL., KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE
MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK, at *i (2002), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageD=14266.
15. ANDY SCHNEIDER ET AL., KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 1 (2000), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PagelD=
13323; SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 17 (noting that people with disabilities are both more
likely to be enrolled in Medicaid and less likely to have private health insurance than mem-
bers of the general population); see also Fred C. v. Tex. Health and Human Serv's Comm'n,
988 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (noting that "the majority of adults with severe
speech disabilities, [are] dependent on government benefits for access to the modem tech-
nology which would allow [them] to speak."); Hunter v. Chiles, 944 F. Supp. 914, 916 (S.D.
Fla. 1996) ("Plaintiffs, like many people with severe speech disabilities, are dependent on
government benefits for access to [augmentative communication devices and services]
which would allow them to communicate verbally.").
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Medicaid beneficiaries by definition are people with low in-
comes and/or disabilities, which means that they
disproportionately fall into the 'justice gap" of unmet civil legal
needs.16 For example, a recent report by the Legal Services Corpo-
ration found that "[o]nly a small fraction of the legal problems
experienced by low-income people (less than one in five) are ad-
dressed with the assistance of either a private attorney (pro bono
or paid) or a legal aid lawyer."17 Attorneys with the National Center
for Medical-Legal Partnership' estimate that "every low-income
family has an average of three unmet legal needs" and that "public-
ly funded legal aid agencies turn away three out of every five
applicants for assistance."'9 This justice gap, compounded by the
barriers present in the Medicaid administrative appeal process en-
countered by Sonya and other beneficiaries, invites new
approaches to the delivery of civil legal services, such as medical-
legal partnerships.
Part I of this Article explores legal and public policy justifica-
tions for Medicaid coverage of services that promote
independence for people with disabilities, such as augmentative
communication devices. Part II describes the Medicaid administra-
tive hearing process and the barriers it presents to people with
disabilities who appeal the denial of a service, such as an augment-
ative communication device. Part III summarizes the existing
scholarship about medical-legal partnerships. Part IV applies the
medical-legal partnership model to the problems typically encoun-
tered by Medicaid beneficiaries in the appeals process. The Article
concludes by recommending some refinements to increase the ac-
ceptance of this new legal services delivery model.
16. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 1 (2009), available at
http://www.Isc.gov/pdfs/documenting-thejustice-gap-in-america2009.pdf.
17. Id.
18. The National Center for Medical-Legal Partnership conducts research and pro-
vides technical assistance to a network of nearly eighty medical-legal partnership sites,
serving over 180 hospitals and health centers, throughout the country. See MLP Networ* Map,
NAT'L CENTER FOR MED.-LEGAL P'SHIP, http://www.medical-legalpartnership.org/mlp-
network (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
19. Ellen Lawton et al., Disparities in Health, Disparities in Law: The Global Potential of In-
dividual Advocacy, in HEALTH CAPITAL AND SUSTAINABLE SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
419, 429 (Patricia A. Cholewka & Mitra M. Modagh eds., 2008).
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF AUGMENTATIVE COMMUNICATION AND
COMMUNITY INTEGRATION
Augmentative communication devices are a cost-effective and ef-
ficient way to facilitate independence and integrate people with
disabilities into society. Community integration is the goal now es-
poused by both societal expectations and legal mandates. Effective
communication is vital to its realization.
As one federal district court observed, the "inability to speak can
be the single most devastating aspect of any handicap."0 Commu-
nication is conceptualized as "the means by which all other rights
are realized and . .. in itself, a basic human right."" The Commu-
nication Bill of Rights promulgated by the National Joint
Committee for the Communication Needs of Persons with Severe
Disabilities underscores the fact that communication is a funda-
mental human need and asserts that "all individuals have a right to
communicate during their daily activities and across the [ir]
lifespan."23
A variety of disabilities impact the ability to successfully initiate
and sustain communication. Medical conditions that may affect
communication abilities include "autism, brain injury, cerebral
20. Fred C., 988 F. Supp. at 1034; see also Hunter, 944 F. Supp. at 920 (noting that the
"ability to speak and communicate is vital").
21. TASH, TASH RESOLUTION ON AUGMENTATIVE AND ALTERNATIVE COMMUNICATION




22. The National Joint Committee for the Communication Needs of Persons with Se-
vere Disabilities provides research, demonstration, and education efforts directed to helping
persons with severe disabilities communicate effectively. Its member agencies include the
American Speech-Language and Hearing Association, American Association on Mental
Retardation, American Occupational Therapy Association, American Physical Therapy Asso-
ciation, Council for Exceptional Children with Communication Disorders, The Association
for Persons with Severe Handicaps, and the United States Society for Augmentative and
Alternative Communication. History of the National Joint Committee for the Communication Needs
of Persons with Severe Disabilities, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING Ass'N, http://
www.asha.org/NJC/history.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
23. Access to Communication Services and Supports: Concerns Regarding the Application of Re-
strictive "Eligibility" Policies, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE HEARING Ass'N, at *2-3, http://
www.asha.org/docs/pdf/TR2002-00233.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Access to
Communication Services]. The National Joint Committee for the Communication Needs of
Persons with Severe Disabilities (NJC), an interdisciplinary group that promulgates consen-
sus statements and recommendations in this area, contends that "(ilt is actually difficult to
imagine a situation in which communication services, including [augmentative communica-
tion supports], are not medically necessary, as most instances of significant communication
limitations are associated with diagnosed conditions." Frequently Asked Questions about Funding
for Service Delivery, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE HEARING Ass'N, http://www.asha.org/NJC/faqs-
funding.htm#15b (last visited Apr. 2, 2011).
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palsy, mental retardation, severe language delay, stroke, and neu-
romuscular disease such as ALS."2 Significantly, research has
shown that "with appropriate instruction and support, individuals
with severe disabilities can learn to communicate effectively regard-
less of the nature and/or cause of their underlying impairments."5
Often, this is accomplished by using augmentative communication
devices.
Augmentative communication devices are "electronic and non-
electronic devices that allow individuals to overcome, to the maxi-
mum extent possible, communication limitations that interfere
with their daily activities. They "support, enhance, or augment
the communication of individuals who are not independent com-
municators in all situations"27 and enable such people to
"communicate when traditional speaking and writing are not effec-
tive."2" Rather than inhibiting speech development, "research has
shown that communication devices actually encourage natural
speech development by reinforcing language through visual, audi-
tory, and motor techniques."29
The Communication Bill of Rights identifies multiple areas in
which augmentative communication devices may play an important
role, such as the
right to request desired objects, actions, events, and people;
refuse undesired objects, actions, or events; express personal
preferences and feelings; be offered choices and alternatives;
. . . request and receive another person's attention and inter-
action; [and] ask for and receive information about changes
in routine and environment ... .
People who have never experienced a disabling condition that im-
pairs communication take such abilities for granted; yet the
fundamental nature of these capacities in achieving independence
and self-actualization cannot be overstated.
24. AAC Fact Sheet, DEL. ASSISTIVE TECH. INITIATIVE, http://www.dati.org/info/
acc.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
25. Access to Communication Services, supra note 23, at *6.
26. William T. v. Taylor, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1272 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
27. Del. Med. Equipment Assistance Program, PROVIDER POLICY- MANUAL.§ 6.4.1, available
at http://www.dmap.state.de.us/downloads/manuals/dme.provider.specific.pdf (last visited
Apr. 2, 2011).
28. AAC Fact Sheet, supra note 24.
29. Id. See also Access to Communication Services, supra note 23, at *5-6.
30. Communication Bill of Rights, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING Ass'N,




By contrast, the view of people with disabilities espoused by the
Medicaid MCO in Sonya's case is closer to that typically associated
with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries rather than to con-
temporary norms; it does not afford dignity and self-worth to these
individuals. Because communication that is effective has been
shown to "enhance self-determination,.. . quality of life, and social
interactions,"" augmentative communication. devices are an im-
portant means of increased autonomy and independence for
persons with disabilities. As one federal district court observed,
without augmentative communication devices, people with "severe
speech disabilities . . . unable to communicate either verbally or
with hand gestures ... are predestined to depend on others and
denied the opportunity to attain [independence] or self-care.""
This result is precisely what Sonya's father sought to avoid for his
daughter, and existing technology provides an easy remedy.
For these reasons, augmentative communication devices are an
important aspect of integrating people with disabilities into the
community. Services like augmentative communication devices fur-
ther goals such as individual autonomy that are at the heart of the
Medicaid program. The general statutory "purpose of the Federal
Medicaid Act is to enable each State 'to furnish ... rehabilitation
and other services to help such families and individuals attain or
retain capacity for independence or self-care . . . .' " As illustrated
by the opening vignette, augmentative communication devices sat-
isfy this goal by supplying an effective, self-directed means of
communication for people with disabilities, which contributes to
independence and self-care.
However, for many years, people with disabilities frequently were
segregated in large residential institutions for all or most of their
lives. Reports of deplorable living conditions and patient abuses
that became known in the latter half of the twentieth century
spurred the movement to deinstitutionalize people with disabili-
ties. The United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in
31. Access to Communication Services, supra note 23, at *3.
32. Hunter v. Chiles, 944 F. Supp. 914, 916 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
33. Id. at 918 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396(2) (1992)).
34. See e.g., Samantha A. DiPolito, Comment, Olmstead v. L.C.-Deinstitutionalization
and Community Integration: An Awakening of the Nation's Conscience, 58 MERCER L. REV. 1381,
1384 (2007) ("For over half of the twentieth century, people with mental and developmental
disabilities were typically placed in large institutions. . . .").
35. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All- A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1415, 1435-36 (2007) (describing investigation of living conditions at Cleve-
land State Hospital); Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One's Own: The Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 1988 and Housing Discrimination against People with Mental Disabilities, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 925,
929 (1994) (noting the development of community programs in lieu of institutionalization
865SUMMER 2011 ]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Olmstead v. L. C. 6 drew on the "community integration mandate"
expressed in Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act in
"[r] ecogni [zing] that unjustified institutional isolation of persons
with disabilities is a form of discrimination."07 The Court suggested
that a state can meet its Olmstead obligations if it "were to demon-
strate that it had a comprehensive, effectively working plan" for
deinstitutionalization of people with disabilities." As of May 2006,
lawsuits seeking community placements for people with develop-
mental disabilities had been filed in twenty-five states.39 Thus, the
pressure on states to effectively serve people with disabilities in
community settings has intensified. Technology such as augmenta-
tive communication devices is an essential means of effectuating
states' Olmstead obligations.
In addition to increasing the independence of people with disa-
bilities, providing augmentative communication devices to people
with disabilities is also cost-effective. As the Fred C. court noted,
"[b]ecause the ability to speak and communicate is vital, augment-
ative communication devices have enabled adult Medicaid
recipients with severe speech impairments to live on their own,
maintain employment, pay taxes and become productive members
of the community rather than wards of the State."o Living in the
community requires appropriate supports and services, the provi-
sion of which has been shown to result in overall cost savings
compared to institutionalized care.4' The costs of providing health
care to people with disabilities are not completely avoidable; they
exist whether people live in institutions or in the community. How-
ever, the Fred C. court credited the increased independence
provided by augmentative communication devices and services
with "limit[ing] the cost of other medical services, such as nursing
expenses, and reduc[ing] or eliminat[ing] the costs of disability
and other welfare benefits."4 2
for people with developmental and mental disabilities); see alsoJefferson D.E. Smith & Steve
P. Calandrillo, Forward to Fundamental Alteration: Addressing ADA Title H Integration Lawsuits
after Olmstead v. L.C., 24 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 695, 703-04 (2001).
36. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
37. Id. at 600.
38. Id. at 605. The Court also identified "a waiting list that moved at a reasonable
pace" as an additional factor. Id. at 606.
39. GARY A. SMITH, HUMAN SERV's RESEARCH INST., STATUS EPORT: LITIGATION
CONCERNING HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR PEOPLE wiTH DISABILITIES 5 (2006),
available at http://www.napas.org/images/Documents/Issues/Community-integration/
NDRNhsri-docket_52906.pdf.
40. Fred C. v. Tex. Health and Human Serv's Comm'n, 988 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (W.D.
Tex. 1997) (citing Saideman, supra note 8, at 741).
41. Smith & Calandrillo, supra note 35, at 704.
42. Fred C., 988 F. Supp. at 1036 (citing Saideman, supra note 8, at 741).
866 [VOL. 44:4
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Beyond improving cost-effectiveness, the increased independ-
ence afforded by augmentative communication also furthers the
community integration goal of dispelling harmful stereotypes ap-
plied to people with disabilities, encouraging a view of people with
disabilities as deserving dignity and full personhood. In support of
its decision, the Olmstead Court noted that "institutional placement
of persons who can handle and benefit from community settings
perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are
incapable or unworthy of participating in community life."4 The
Court also acknowledged that "confinement in an institution se-
verely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals,
including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic
independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrich-
ment."4 All of these activities, of course, are enhanced by the
ability to communicate effectively.
The community integration movement reveals the fluid nature
of medical conditions that were once perceived to be immutable
and permanently disabling. Cases like Sonya's exemplify the nature
of disability as a social construct. According to this view, the con-
straints faced by people with disabilities are a function of the way
society is extrinsically ordered rather than resulting from the in-
trinsic physical or mental limitations imposed by a medical
condition. Thus, disability "is not an unavoidable result of injury
and chronic disease. Rather, disability results, in part, from choices
society makes about health care, working conditions, housing,
transportation, and other aspects of the overall environment."4 6
Technology such as augmentative communication devices counters
43. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999).
44. Id. at 601.
45. See, e.g., PAUL K. LONGMORE, WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON Dis-
ABILITY, 238-39 (2003) (observing that disability "is not simply caused by impairments or by
physiological features that depart from the typical. Instead, disability is produced through
the dynamic interplay of a complicated constellation of factors that includes, not only stig-
matized physical and mental limitations and physiological differences, but also physical and
architectural environments, social arrangements and cultural values, and the impact of pub-
lic policies themselves" and that disability "is not an objective condition. It is a set of socially
produced, highly mutable, historically evolving social identities and roles").
46. Marilyn J. Field & Alan M.Jette, Dealing with Disability, ISSUES IN ScI. & TECH., Win-
ter 2008, at *1, available at http://www.issues.org/24.2/field.html; see also Richard K. Scotch,
Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 BERKELEY J. Emp. & LAB. L. 213,
214 (2000) (noting that "[i]n the socio-political model, disability is viewed not as a physical
or mental impairment, but as a social construction shaped by environmental factors, includ-
ing physical characteristics built into the environment, cultural attitudes and social
behaviors, and the institutionalized rules, procedures, and practices of private entities and
public organizations."); Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability: Perspective of the Disability
Community, 3J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 352, 356 (2000) (emphasizing that disability is a
social contruct).
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the intrinsic effects of medical conditions, making them less disa-
bling.
Many of the problems faced by people with disabilities stem
from societal discrimination and stereotypes that promote the er-
roneous equation of disability with dependence and incapacity.4 1 In
this vein, society's perceptions about people with disabilities' po-
tential to contribute meaningfully to the community influence the
actual limitations experienced by this population.8 In Sonya's case,
the Medicaid managed care organization's views about the type
and extent of communication that was adequate for a person with
Sonya's disabilities-getting attention through primitive means
such as groaning and banging on objects-influenced its determi-
nation that an augmentative communication device was not
"necessary." Recognizing the extent to which the restrictions asso-
ciated with disability are socially constructed allows people with
disabilities to be viewed in a different light. This is particularly true
when technology, such as augmentative communication devices,
helps to counter the effects of socially constructed disability.
The arguments in support of Medicaid coverage for augmenta-
tive communication devices and services also serve the important
interest of adjudicatory economy. Society has an interest in maxim-
izing the effectiveness and efficiency of the legal system. Similarly,
individual Medicaid beneficiaries have an interest in avoiding the
delays associated with coverage denials that are not legally justified.
Particularly where, as here, the governing law strongly supports
Medicaid coverage, people like Sonya should not have to forgo
the developmental opportunities presented by augmentative com-
munication while waiting for an appeal to be resolved, nor should
they need to navigate an adjudicatory process that is stacked
against them.
Ensuring access to technology such as augmentative communi-
cation devices is increasingly important because people with
disabilities are living longer. People with medical conditions who
formerly did not survive beyond birth or childhood are now living
47. See Scotch, supra note 46, at 215-16 ("People with disabilities are victimized by
negative stereotypes that associate physical or mental impairment with assumed dependence
on others and a general incapacity to perform social and economic activities."); see also
Kaplan, supra note 46, at 355 ("The disability model recognizes social discrimination as the
most significant problem experienced by persons with disabilities and as the cause of many
of the problems that are regarded as intrinsic to the disability under other models.").
48. See Scotch, supra note 46, at 215 ("Thus, the consequences of physical and mental
impairments for social participation are shaped by the expectations and attitudes of the
larger society.").
49. See discussion infra Part II.
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well into adulthood.50 Thus, .there is increasing demand for tech-
nology like augmentative communication devices to improve the
quality of life and promote independence for people with disabili-
ties. Medical advances are not only prolonging life but also are
creating increasingly effective and sophisticated ways of augment-
ing natural abilities and assisting people with disabilities. For these
advances to be meaningful, people with disabilities must have ac-
cess to new devices that are appropriate for their needs.
Despite the significant potential for augmentative communica-
tion devices to alter both negative societal perceptions of people
with disabilities and the real barriers they encounter in daily life,
the path to accessing such technology is rife with obstacles.
II. BARRIERS ENCOUNTERED BY MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES SEEKING
COVERAGE OF AUGMENTATIVE COMMUNICATION DEVICES
Given the benefits of augmentative communication devices, bar-
riers to Medicaid coverage must be minimized. Receiving a
prescription for a medical device or service from a doctor often is
not the endpoint in a Medicaid beneficiary's search for effective
treatment. Rather, the Medicaid program's denial of coverage
marks the beginning of an appeals process that many beneficiaries
find confusing, tedious, and adversarial. While Sonya's story ended
well, this result did not come about without a contentious fight
that lasted several months and required both legal and medical
expertise. In fact, most Medicaid appellants' stories really begin
not with a doctor's prescription, but with the denial of payment for
51a necessary service.
Once a Medicaid beneficiary is denied coverage of a prescribed
service, she faces daunting obstacles to an appeal. First, coupled
50. See, e.g., CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITz, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT: LEGISLA-
TIVE ROOTS 87 (1988) (observing that in colonial America, the "inability to prevent or
combat infections suggests that many children with physical infirmities would not have sur-
vived for more than days or weeks"); COMM. ON DISABILITY IN AM., THE FUTURE OF
DISABILITY IN AMERICA 98 (MarilynJ. Field & Alan M.Jette eds., 2007) ("For children with
cystic fibrosis, congenital heart disease, spina bifida, and other conditions that once were
often or always fatal in infancy or childhood, what might earlier have seemed a fantasy of the
future-planning for college and work life-is now a reality for many families.").
51. There is a lack of easily accessible data surrounding the Medicaid benefits process.
For example, I am unable to locate statistics about the number of Medicaid service denials
in a given period of time, the number of appeals arising from those denials, or the outcomes
of those appeals. The National Health Law Program, the national backup center for legal
services attorneys working in this area, also is unfamiliar with the compilation of such data.
This suggests a fruitful area of future research to quantify the problem, while my years of
experience working in this field suggest that the problem is not a small one.
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with the scarcity of lawyers available to Medicaid beneficiaries is the
fact that interpretation of the federal Medicaid Acte in the process
of making coverage determinations is an arduous challenge for
both judges and lawyers. Writing for the United States Supreme
Court, Justice Powell observed that the statute's "Byzantine con-
struction" makes it "almost unintelligible to the uninitiated.""5
Other judges have characterized the Medicaid Act as an "aggravat-
ed assault on the English language"" and a "virtually impenetrable
'Serbonian bog' "" For Medicaid recipients, the appeals process is
an onerous task, with access to crucial medical services hanging in
the balance."
The Medicaid appeals process offers two options for beneficiar-
ies facing service denials. A Medicaid beneficiary may request an
informal hearing with the MCO, as Sonya did. In addition, she also
may request an administrative "fair hearing" with an independent
branch of the state agency that administers Medicaid benefits.
However, each route presents several barriers to the effective reso-
lution of these cases. These barriers can be divided into three
general groups: disincentives to initiate the appeal; inequities in
the administrative hearing process itself; and misinformation or
incomplete information underlying decisions in the prior authori-
zation5" and appeals context. For these reasons, it is not surprising
that "[w]ithout trained advocates, eligible recipients might forfeit
their right to essential benefits."5 9
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396(w) (5) (West 2011).
53. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981).
54. Friedman v. Berger, 409 F. Supp. 1225, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
55. Ross v. Giardi, 680 A.2d 113, 116 (Conn. 1996).
56. See Lisa Brodoff, Lifting Burdens: Proof Social Justice, and Public Assistance Administra-
tive Hearings, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 131, 142 (2008) (describing the
"devastating" effects of the denial or termination of Medicaid medical services).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (3) (2006) (establishing the hearing option); 42 C.F.R.
§ 431.205 (2007) (fleshing out rules for the hearing process). Such a hearing is the type
endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
58. Prior authorization is the process by which a Medicaid beneficiary specifically re-
quests MCO coverage of a prescribed service, before the service is provided. See, e.g.,
Chasan-Sloan, supra note 3, at 290 (asserting that effective appeal procedures take on great-
er importance in the managed care context because "[u]nder the original fee-for-service
Medicaid system, beneficiaries' disputes generally concerned reimbursement by the Medi-
caid program for services already rendered" while "disputes in Medicaid managed care ...
are more likely to involve the outright denial or delay of services").
59. David I. Schulman et aL, Public Health Legal Services: A Ne Vision, 15 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & PoL'Y 729, 776 (2008).
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A. (Dis)incentives to Initiate an Appeal
The circumstances in which a Medicaid beneficiary and her fam-
ily find themselves prior to initiating an appeal are often significant
determinants in the decision to appeal. For example, in addition to
seeking Medicaid approval of prescribed services, recipients and
their families are frequently dealing with a private health insurer,o
with its own coverage standards, requiring the navigation of multi-
61ple and at times contradictory systems.
Furthermore, the health care system is only one arena in which
conflicts arise. Families also must advocate with their child's school
district for appropriate educational programming and related ser-
vices.6 2 They must find a way to go to work when the private duty
nurse or home health aide who will care for a child in the parent's
absence is unable to cover her shift. They must adhere to a regular
schedule of doctor's appointments, visits with specialists, medical
testing, and various therapy sessions one or more times a week-
physical, occupational, or speech, or sometimes all three.
Additionally, children with significant disabilities often require a
dizzying array of medication, equipment, and supplies, each of
which must be obtained, administered, and maintained each day.
All of these demands intensify when a child, sometimes unpredict-
ably, experiences a medical emergency or another exacerbation of
her illness. Against this backdrop (without even addressing the
parents' own needs and the needs of other children in the family),
it is not difficult to see why the decision to appeal a Medicaid ser-
vice denial, even if the prescription is in fact medically necessary, is
60. Children with significant disabilities can qualify for Medicaid regardless of house-
hold income through a state option under the Tax Equity Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA), informally known as the "Katie Beckett" Medicaid option. Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 134, 96 Stat. 324, 375 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(3) (2006)).
61. Because Medicaid is the payor of last resort, any private insurance coverage that a
child has must deny a service request to trigger Medicaid coverage. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396a(a) (25), b(o) (establishing that Medicaid applies only to fill in gaps not covered by
private insurance). The Medicaid benefits package for children offers a comprehensive
array of services, and its focus on "correct[ing] or ameliorat[ing]" all physical and mental
health conditions and their effects provides a favorable standard for children with disabili-
ties. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d. By contrast, private health insurance policies typically are designed
to cover generally healthy people with relatively short-term treatment needs. For example,
private health insurance policies may cover physical therapy for a limited period of time,
such as sixty days, which may allow rehabilitation for someone injured in an accident but is
insufficient for the years of therapy needed by children with cerebral palsy, muscular dystro-
phy, and other congenital conditions.
62. See generally Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1409
(2006) (providing special education and related services for qualifying children with disabil-
ities); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006) (requiring school districts to reasonably accommodate
children with disabilities).
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not one to be taken lightly: families of children with significant
disabilities must carefully choose the battles to which they devote
their limited time and energy." Such extrinsic factors cannot be
directly remedied by reforms to the Medicaid appeals process.
B. (Un)fair Hearings
Despite an administrative process that is designed to be less
formal than court," families frequently find that Medicaid appeals
are complex and adversarial battlegrounds. This is due to several
factors, both procedural and substantive.
First, the appeals process is multi-layered and not intuitive for a
layperson to navigate. If Medicaid benefits are administered by a
managed care organization (MCO), a beneficiary must be afforded
an in-person informal hearing at the MCO.6 5 Because the MCO
retains a great deal of control over the informal hearing process,
this option may or may not present a realistic opportunity to have
an initial denial reversed. For example, the decision maker at an
MCO hearing can range from a sole MCO employee to a panel
that also includes representatives from the state Medicaid agency
and the health plan members. The MCO hearing can thus involve
a careful second look at the merits of the prescription or a mere
rubber stamp of the original denial.
63. Cf Brodoff, supra note 56, at 152 (noting that public assistance recipients often are
disadvantaged in the appeals process by the barriers of "poverty, disability, age, education,
[and] language").
64. The alternative to the fair hearing process, challenging Medicaid denials in federal
court as a violation of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, is beyond the scope of this Article.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(b)(4) (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 438.406(b)(2) (2009). Despite the
federal requirement that the MCO offer the beneficiary the chance to appear in person, the
MCOs' adherence to this requirement was variable in my experience. See, e.g., N.D., DPCI
#0001337430, at *22, Steinberg, H.O. (Del. Dep't of Health & Soc. Serv's, Div. of Medicaid
and Medical Assistance May 21, 2007) (noting "Appellant['s] conten[tion] that she was not
provided with an opportunity to participate in an in-person hearing during the internal
appeals with [the MCO]" and that "the agency is also aware of continuing concerns about
the availability of in-person appearances for members").
66. In my experience, including diverse perspectives on the hearing panel helps to
make the process exhibit more of the characteristics of a critical review of the underlying
determination rather than a rubber stamp on the MCO's denial. The manner in which the
MCO conducts an informal health plan hearing, such as Sonya's, can also limit the advocacy
opportunities. For example, when I first began practicing in these fora, the Medicaid bene-
ficiary and her representative were not allowed in the hearing room during the MCO's
presentation to the panel. After I appealed to the state Medicaid director, the beneficiary
and her representative won the right to be in the room, but still were forbidden from ques-
tioning the MCO's witnesses, which detracts from the full presentation of both sides of the
case.
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After or instead of an internal MCO hearing, Medicaid benefi-
ciaries always have the right to an administrative "fair hearing."67 In
the tradition of Goldberg v. Kelly, this forum is intended to provide
recipients with the opportunity to be heard, as required by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.6 A beneficiary's rights at a Medicaid fair hearing in-
clude the ability to present witnesses, evidence, and arguments and
to cross-examine adverse witnesses.69 This hearing offers the prom-
ise of a deliberately neutral review, if the beneficiary is able to
navigate the process.
Formal administrative hearing officers, however, need not be
lawyers. They are intended to be neutral decision-makers, but they
nonetheless are employed by the state, albeit in a different arm of
the agency than the entity that determines initial eligibility and
directly administers benefits. There is no guarantee that the hear-
ing officer will truly be "neutral," however; "in almost half of all
state hearing systems, the [hearing officer] is directly employed by
the very agency whose decision is being challenged."70 Elsewhere,
the "administrative hearing office is .. . often funded by the very
agencies whose decisions they are overseeing.",7
The reality that the adverse party has a greater degree of famili-
arity with the administrative hearing process also influences the
Medicaid beneficiary's experience. Denials are defended by either
the state Medicaid agency or a private MCO that contracts with the
state agency to administer benefits. In either scenario, the adverse
party is a repeat player in the hearing process, unlike most Medi-
caid beneficiaries and their families who are unfamiliar with
administrative hearings.
Further skewing the balance against the beneficiary is the fact
that the adverse party always has access to legal counsel, either
through the state Attorney General's office or through a private
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (3) (2006).
68. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) ("'[T]he stakes are simply too high for
the welfare recipient, and the possibility for honest error or irritable misjudgment too great,
to allow termination of aid without giving the recipient a chance, if he so desires, to be fully
informed of the case against him so that he may contest its basis and produce evidence in
rebuttal.'" (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 904-905 (S.D.N.Y. 1968))); see also 42
C.F.R. § 431.205(d) (2007) (requiring state Medicaid programs to establish hearing proce-
dures that meet the Goldberg v. Kelly requirements).
69. 42 C.F.R. § 431.242 (2009).
70. Brodoff, supra note 56, at 157-58 (internal citations omitted) (analogizing such an
arrangement to "having the fox guard the henhouse") Id. at 158).
71. Id.at159.
72. See id. at 152-53 ((noting that public assistance recipients "are disadvantaged by
the fact that the state is always represented by an experienced advocate in the hearing") Id.
at 152).
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law firm retained by the MCO.' By contrast, most beneficiaries
proceed pro se in their appeals and must navigate a legal realm that
is far from intuitive.
Although formal administrative hearings do not require all of
the official procedures of a trial, they often involve technicalities
that laypersons may not be able to master, such as hearsay objec-
tions. 5 And, because any further appeal in the state court system is
on the record,5 the administrative hearing is the only opportunity
to present witness testimony and other evidence. For these reasons,
having a legal representative at the formal administrative hearing is
vital to ensure that a Medicaid beneficiary has the best possible
opportunity to overturn a service denial.7
The support of a doctor is just as important as that of a lawyer
for beneficiaries in Medicaid appeals. Perhaps most significantly,
the doctors and nurses who will testify in support of the denial are
employees of the adverse party.78 This means that participating in
administrative hearings is part of their job, and consequently, they
73. Query whether the use of Medicaid program funds to retain private lawyers is, in
the words of one state Medicaid medical necessity definition, the "least costly, appropriate
... alternative" and an "effective and appropriate use of program funds," particularly when
the cost of litigating a case may exceed the cost of actually providing the services at issue in
the appeal. 2 Del. Reg. Regs. 1250 (Jan. 1, 1999). To cite just one example, I represented a
teenager who required surgery to correct gynecomastia. The Medicaid program denied
coverage, but we obtained a commitment from a hospital to donate the medical providers'
time to perform the procedure. The only costs would be the necessary supplies. Acknowl-
edging that the MCO would spend significantly more in legal fees going to hearing, the case
was nonetheless litigated. In the end, the MCO's decision was reversed, and it was ordered
to pay for the procedure in full.
74. See, e.g., Brodoff, supra note 56, at 148 (noting that the "vast majority of public as-
sistance appellants appear at their hearings pro se").
75. See Brodoff, supra note 56, at 149 (describing fair hearings as "a scary, intimidating,
and complex process that involves court-like procedures, public speaking, motion practice,
entry of exhibits, objections to evidence, and an understanding of complicated laws and
procedures").
76. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 520 (2009) ("Any applicant for or recipient of
public assistance benefits. . . may appeal [a] decision .... The appeal shall be on the record
without a trial de novo.")
77. The administrative hearing process is effectively the only means of appeal in this
context. See Brodoff, supra note 56, at 143, 146-47 (noting that "very few public assistance
cases are appealed into the court system" and explaining that to succeed on appeal, a "pub-
lic assistance appellant must not only be savvy enough to have put on all the testimony and
exhibits necessary for the [administrative lawjudge] to make favorable factual findings, she
must also have spotted and raised all the legal arguments and defenses she could have at the
hearing" as well as overcome "the deference courts give to an agency's permissible construc-
tion of its governing statutes").
78. See id. at 153-54 ("Welfare agencies can and do call their own doctors, dentists,
nurses, and program managers, to testify as paid experts .... Finding and hiring expert
witnesses who can testify [on behalf of the appellant] ... is difficult at best for low-income
appellants in the hearing process. Yet this expert testimony can be the decisive evidence in a
benefits eligibility case.").
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are willing and available to do so. By contrast, the Medicaid benefi-
ciary's prescribing physician and other treatment providers must
take time out of their busy schedules and agree to testify. In many
states, the administrative hearing officer lacks subpoena power to
compel witnesses' attendance.
While some doctors generously take the time to advocate for
their patients, there are many reasons why doctors will not volun-
tarily participate in these hearings. Sometimes the treating
provider is employed by the same health system that contains the
Medicaid MCO, in which case the provider's employer may refuse
to give permission for the provider to participate. Even without
such a direct conflict, there are economic disincentives: providers'
time is valuable, and they are paid to see patients, not to partici-
pate in administrative hearings. Sometimes, doctors tell patients
that they will not testify unless the patient pays a sizeable hourly
rate.
In other situations, a hospital's general counsel's office may not
allow its employees to testify, despite the fact that the proceedings
are closed and do not involve allegations of wrongdoing on behalf
of the treating doctor. Still other doctors are reluctant of their own
accord to become involved with any enterprise that involves law-
yers. 9 Lawyers' reputations precede them in the medical field, and
doctors generally see lawyers as adversaries, not allies.o Even will-
ing doctors proceed with trepidation, as they are likely unfamiliar
with the hearing process and wary of cross-examination.
If the treating provider will not participate, it may be possible,
although not without significant extra effort, to locate another
supportive physician who is willing to review the case and provide a
professional opinion pro bono. Testimony at the administrative hear-
ing may be required, but many times, a well-written letter of
medical necessity with supporting medical records and the
knowledge that a treating provider is willing to participate in a
hearing can be enough for the MCO to change its mind. To be
most effective, this type of collaboration needs to occur early in the
prior authorization process. Regardless, it is extremely difficult to
79. In one case that I handled, in which a prescribing physician was reluctant to testify
in support of a prescription he wrote for a patient, the general counsel for the hospital
agreed that he had no legal obligation to do so, but pointed out that he did have a moral
one.
80. See, e.g., Elizabeth Tobin Tyler, Allies Not Adversaries: Teaching Collaboration to the
Next Generation of Doctors and Lawyers to Address Social Inequality, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 249, 249-50 (2008) (describing the sometimes antagonistic relationship between the
two professions).
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prevail in Medicaid service denial cases without some expert medi-
cal opinion to counter that of the MCO's medical director.
Finally, substantive Medicaid law is a complex collection of fed-
eral and state statutes, regulations, and sub-regulatory material.
Consider the legal analysis required to obtain Medicaid coverage
for an augmentative communication device. A prescribed service
must satisfy two tests before it is approved: it must fit into one of
the enumerated federal statutory categories, and it must be deter-
mined "medically necessary."
Augmentative communication devices can qualify under four
statutory categories. The first is equipment or appliances suitable
for use in the home, a component of the mandatory home health
services category, which must be included in every state's Medicaid
program.8' In addition, there are three optional categories of Med-
icaid covered services into which augmentative communication
devices may fall: "physical therapy and related services," which ex-
pressly includes "services for individuals with speech, hearing, and
language disorders ... includ[ing] any necessary supplies and
equipment;",2 prosthetic devices, which are prescribed, inter alia, to
"[p]revent or correct physical deformity or malfunction;"83 and
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (7) (2006) (listing "home health care services" as a medi-
cal service); 42 C.ER. § 440.70 (2009) (further defining "home health services"); 42 C.F.R.
§ 441.15 (2009) (fleshing out the definition in § 440.70). Some twenty-four states currently
classify augmentative communication devices in this category. See William T. v. Taylor, 465 F.
Supp. 2d 1267, 1285 n.21 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (citing Pls.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at
23); see also Fred C. v. Tex. Health and Human Servs' Comm'n, 988 F. Supp. 1032, 1036
(W.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that augmentative communication devices are "durable medical
equipment and covered as a Texas Medicaid benefit"); Hunter v. Chiles, 944 F. Supp. 914,
920 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that augmentative communication devices and services are
"durable medical equipment and covered as a Florida Medicaid benefit under the home
health care provision"). But seeWolan v. Thomas, No. CV 970404219, 1998 WL 165107, at *1,
*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 1998) (endorsing as "reasonable" the conclusion that aug-
mentative communication device is not medical equipment because it does not "diagnose,
treat or prevent ... the recurring esophageal stenosis condition" that made plaintiffs
speech "very difficult to understand").
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(11) (defining Medicaid "medical assistance" to include
"physical therapy and related services"); 42 C.F.R. § 440.110 (further defining "physical
therapy"); William T, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1287 & n.24 (noting that three states classify aug-
mentative communication devices in this category and finding that augmentative
communication devices "are properly considered [speech-language pathology] equip-
ment"); see also Meyers v. Reagan, 776 F.2d 241, 243-44 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that "Iowa
cannot arbitrarily exclude electronic speech devices from coverage under its Medicaid pro-
gram" which included "physical therapy and related services"). But see Wolan, 1998 WL
165107, at *3-4 (rejecting claim for Medicaid coverage premised upon classification of
augmentative communication device as a speech pathology service, because device did not
"[pirevent or correct physical deformity or malfunction ... [or] diagnose, screen for or
prevent the plaintiff's cerebral palsy or speech dysarthria ... [or] correct his conditions").
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(12) (defining Medicaid "medical assistance" to include
"prosthetic devices"); 42 C.F.R. § 440.120(c) (further defining "prosthetic devices"); William
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"other ... rehabilitative service including any medical or remedial
services (provided in a facility, a home, or other setting) recom-
mended by a physician . . . for the maximum reduction of physical
or mental disability and restoration of an individual to the best
possible functional level."8
A related point is that state Medicaid programs must offer the
potential for coverage of augmentative communication devices
somewhere in their benefits packages. Coverage must be more
than an illusory promise; to be legally sufficient, beneficiaries must
have a realistic chance to actually obtain coverage. Thus, states may
not unconditionally omit augmentative communication devices
from all categories of Medicaid covered services. One federal dis-
trict court noted that in eighteen cases, no court had permitted a
state Medicaid program to exclude these devices from coverage
either generally or for a specific sub-population of beneficiaries.5
Moreover, states must offer payment rates for augmentative com-
munication devices that enable beneficiaries to actually obtain the
devices that are authorized." Furthermore, states cannot limit
Medicaid service categories to only some groups of beneficiaries.
Rather, if a state elects an optional category of Medicaid services, it
must provide those services to all eligible beneficiaries.
T, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1286 & n.23 (noting that 15 states classify augmentative communica-
tion devices as prosthetic devices for Medicaid coverage purposes and holding that
augmentative communication devices "correct physical malfunction by replacing the func-
tions of the brain, nerve pathways, and organs of speech, which when unimpaired, yield
intelligible speech" (citing and quoting Pls.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ.J. at 28 n. 79));
Fred. C., 988 F. Supp. at 1037 (rejecting argument that augmentative communication is not a
prosthetic device because it does not replace missing vocal cords). But see Wolan, 1998 WL
165107, at *3 (finding that augmentative communication device did not meet definition of
prosthesis because "plaintiff is not missing his vocal cords, they are damaged [and h]is vocal
cords are not corrected, replaced or supported by" the prescribed augmentative communi-
cation device).
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(13) (defining Medicaid "medical assistance" to include
"rehabilitative services"). Medicaid "[r]ehabilitative services ... includes any medical or
remedial services recommended by a physician ... for maximum reduction of physical or
mental disability and restoration of a recipient to his best possible functional level." 42
C.F.R. § 440.130(d).
85. See William T, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1285 (citing Pls.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ.J.
at 21).
86. See Case Reports: Health-California Agrees to Reimbursement Rates Sufficient to
Give Medicaid Recipients Access to Speech-Generating Devices, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
107, 107 (2005) (summarizing the case ofJoseph Q. v. Shewry [Bonta], a challenge to Cali-
fornia's 20% payment rate reduction, which plaintiffs alleged made the Medicaid payment
rate for augmentative communication devices substantially below that paid by other funding
sources); see also Brief for Plaintiff, Joseph Q. v. Bonta, No. CIV. S-04-1008, (E.D. Cal. case
settled Oct. 25, 2004), available at http://www.povertylaw.org/poverty-law-library/case/
55800/55870/55870a.pdf.
87. See Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 501-02, 511 (8th Cir. 2006) ("While a state
has discretion to determine the optional services in its Medicaid plan, a state's failure to
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Once a service is determined to be part of a statutory category,
the second part of the legal test requires that it then satisfy the
state's definition of Medicaid medical necessity.8 While the legal
analysis for adults turns to each state's individual criteria at this
point, the federal Medicaid Act applies another set of require-
ments to children. Medicaid's mandatory Early and Periodic
Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) provisions,89 with
their own definition of medical necessity,o govern determinations
for Medicaid beneficiaries age twenty-one and younger.1 Under
EPSDT, medical services must be covered for Medicaid beneficiar-
ies under age twenty-one if the services are "necessary ... to
correct or ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and
conditions discovered by the screening services, whether or not
such services are covered under the State plan."9 Congress also has
directed that all of the categories of covered services listed in the
Medicaid Act must be made available to ESPDT beneficiaries, re-
gardless of whether the state has elected to include any optional
service categories in its Medicaid benefits package for adults.94 This
provide Medicaid coverage for non-experimental, medically-necessary services within a cov-
ered Medicaid category is both per se unreasonable and inconsistent with the stated goals of
Medicaid.").
88. See, e.g., Lagowski v. Whalen, 706 N.Y.S.2d 283, 284 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (43) (2006) (mandating that a State plan for medical assis-
tance provide for "informing all [eligible] persons in the State who are under the age of 21
... of the availability of early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services");
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (5) (defining "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment
services"); 42 C.F.R. § 440.40(b) (fleshing out the definition of EPSDT); see also S.D. ex rel.
Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 589 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The medical assistance made available
to EPSDT children must be for health care described in the list of twenty-seven categories
set forth in § 1396d(a)-modified by the requirement that it must be necessary for correc-
tive or ameliorative EPSDT purposes further modified by the statutory mandate that it
must be provided whether or not it is covered under the state plan.").
90. See, e.g., S.D., 391 F.3d at 589-93; Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Freels, 576 S.E.2d 2, 6
(Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming that "'[i]nstead of requiring proof that [a medical service]
... meets the definition of medical necessity reserved for adult Medicaid recipients, the
[Department] should have focused its inquiry on whether [the service] was necessary to
correct or ameliorate [the EPSDT child's] physical condition'" (quoting Freels v. Comm'r,
No. 01-CV-2932-10, 2001 WL 1809412, at *4 (Ga. Super. Ct. 2001))).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (43); 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (4) (B); 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (5).
92. EPSDT screening services include doctor's appointments "at such other intervals,
indicated as medically necessary, to determine the existence of certain physical or mental
illnesses or conditions." 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (1) (A) (ii).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5). Courts have looked to the dictionary definition of ame-
liorate-"'to make better or more tolerable'"-to guide their analysis of medical necessity
under EPSDT. Collins ex ret Collins v. Hamilton, 231 F. Supp. 2d 840, 849 (S.D. Ind. 2002)
(citing WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1963)).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (5); see also Rosie D. v. Romney, 410 F. Supp. 2d 18, 26 (D.
Mass. 2006) ("The breadth of EPSDT requirements is underscored by the statute's defini-
tion of 'medical services.' Section 1396d(a)(13) defines as covered medical services any
'diagnostic, screening, preventative, and rehabilitative services, including any medical or
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means that all four of the above statutory categories are available
for children to access augmentative communication device cover-
age, even if only the sole mandatory category (home health
services) is available to adults in the state.
The EPSDT medical necessity standard also means that, for
Medicaid beneficiaries age twenty-one and younger, states may not
incorporate other criteria, such as appropriateness,95 standard of
care,9 6 cost, or other elements into the medical necessity determi-
nation.97 By articulating a definition of medical necessity
remedial services . . . for the maximum reduction of physical or mental disability and restoration
of an individual to the best possible functional leveL'" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(13)));
Ekloff v. Rogers, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1179-80 (D. Ariz. 2006) (observing that "[e]very
Circuit which has examined the scope of the EPSDT program has recognized that states
must cover every type of health care or service necessary for EPSDT corrective or ameliora-
tive purposes that is allowable under § 1396d(a)" and that "from reading the legislative
history and the Congressional Record, it appears that there is a very strong inference to be
inclusive rather than exclusive").
95. For an example of the court interpreting this standard, see Jackson v. Millstone,
801 A.2d 1034, 1048-49 (Md. Ct. App. 2002) ("The federal program makes no mention of
utilizing an 'appropriateness' analysis in determining whether a [M]edicaid-eligible child
should receive medically necessary treatments provided through EPSDT services. Neverthe-
less, the Maryland [M]edicaid provision regarding preauthorization of services ... requires
that medically necessary treatment for a [M]edicaid-eligible child must also be 'appropri-
ate,' which is beyond the dictates of federal law. The federal guidelines allow states no
discretion to use an 'appropriateness' test in deciding whether a person under 21 can re-
ceive medically necessary treatment. Therefore, because the provision imposes additional
criteria upon qualified recipients, which illegally denies services to those who would normal-
ly receive medically necessary treatment, we agree with the plaintiffs that [the Maryland
regulation] is partially invalid under federal law.").
96. [T)he Department applied the wrong legal standard by focusing on whether [the
therapy at issue] was an accepted treatment that was medically necessary . ... [T]he proper
inquiry was whether [the therapy] was necessary "to correct or ameliorate a physical or men-
tal defect or condition" regardless of whether it is an accepted medical practice .... / .... /
... [T] he federal statute does not require that a treatment also be "an acceptable standard
of medical practice" .... "[Ilnstead of requiring proof that [a service] is the accepted
standard medical practice, or that it meets the definition of medical necessity reserved for
adult Medicaid recipients, the [Department] should have focused its inquiry on whether
[the therapy] was necessary to correct or ameliorate [Freels'] physical condition."
Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Freels, 576 S.E.2d 2, 5-6 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (internal citations
omitted).
97. See, e.g., S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 585, 592 (5th Cir. 2004) (observ-
ing, in a case in which the "state administrative law judge ruled in favor of [the state
Medicaid program] without referring to the Medicaid EPSDT provisions," that "the plain
words of the statute and the legislative history make evident that Congress intended that the
health care, services, treatment and other measures that must be provided under the EPSDT
program be determined by reference to federal law, not state preferences"); Collins v. Ham-
ilton, 349 F.3d 371, 375-76 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting state Medicaid program's attempt to
read an additional criterion (a durational limit) into the EPSDT medical necessity stand-
ard); C.E v. Dep't of Children & Families, 934 So. 2d 1, 5-6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) ("The
hearing officer erred in applying [a] definition[] of 'medical necessity' ... that [is] too
restrictive and violate[s] federal Medicaid law .... Because C.F. is a minor entitled to
EPSDT benefits, his need for . .. services must be evaluated under the more expansive fed-
eral definition.").
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specifically for children who receive Medicaid, in addition to plac-
ing an emphasis on preventive healthcare," and mandating that
states cover children for all services that are considered optional
under federal law for adults,"9 Congress demonstrated its intention
that Medicaid coverage of children's benefits be expansive. Conse-
quently, children's requests for medically necessary augmentative
communication devices should not often be denied.
At best different, and at times competing, definitions of medical
necessary for children and adults further complicate the legal
analysis in this area. To the extent that a state's own Medicaid med-
ical necessity definition differs from the EPSDT statutory
definition, arguments for generous coverage of augmentative
communication devices for children could unwittingly undercut
arguments for coverage of the same services for adults. However,
courts that have considered the issue have reached the opposite
conclusion and instead used a state's coverage of augmentative
communication devices for children to require similar coverage for
adult Medicaid beneficiaries.'o For example, in a case involving a
forty-eight year old man with brain damage from a head injury sus-
tained when he was twelve, the federal district court ordered Texas
to provide an augmentative communication device under its Medi-
caid program.10' The district court, later affirmed by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, concluded that Texas's classification of
augmentative communication devices as home health services and
prosthetic devices for EPSDT beneficiaries but not for adults was
patently unreasonable: "[t]his Court cannot divine a rational basis
98. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (1) (2006) (mandating periodic screening services);
H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 399 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2125 (describing
"preventative thrust of the EPSDT benefit").
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (stating that necessary services must be provided under
EPSDT "whether or not such services are covered under the State plan"). Under Medicaid,
states may choose (from a list of optional services) which services they will offer for adults in
their state Medicaid plans. This section of the statute makes clear, however, that all services
on the list must be covered for children, regardless of which options the state has selected
for adults.
100. See Fred C. v. Tex. Health and Human Serv's Comm'n, 988 F. Supp. 1032, 1036
(W.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that "Texas Medicaid's selection of age as the sole criterion for
denying benefits is wholly unrelated to the medical decision at hand and cannot meet the
fundamental legal concept of reasonableness" where state Medicaid program considered
augmentative communication devices to be durable medical equipment for EPSDT benefi-
ciaries (children) but not for adult recipients of home health services); Hunter v. Chiles, 944
F. Supp. 914, 920 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (finding that Medicaid funding for augmentative commu-
nication devices "cannot be denied on the basis of age"); see also William T. v. Taylor, 465 F.
Supp. 2d 1267, 1288 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (supporting, in dicta, plaintiffs' objection to draft
criteria limiting augmentative communication coverage to beneficiaries under 21 as violative





to make available the blessings of speech to one who is twenty years
three hundred sixty-four days old and deny the same blessing to
one who is two days older.,0 2 Thus, state coverage of augmentative
communication devices for EPSDT beneficiaries can buttress com-
parable claims for adult Medicaid beneficiaries. Both children and
adults, however, fare better in Medicaid appeals with the support of
lawyers and doctors.
C. (Mis)information Underlying Decisions to Deny
A final group of barriers to coverage of augmentative communi-
cation devices is the information, or lack thereof, that is
considered by decision-makers in the Medicaid appeals context.
This problem has multiple dimensions. First, the MCOs tend not to
seek input from the prescribing physician when making coverage
determinations. Information that the MCOs do collect when mak-
ing coverage decisions is typically limited to medical and,
sometimes, school records. The creators of those records, however,
are typically not familiar with the criteria used in Medicaid cover-
age determinations and therefore may not address those issues.
One reason why MCOs may not seek relevant information from
prescribers may be that the MCO system provides incentives for the
MCO not to spend money. Unlike the traditional fee-for-service
system, MCOs are paid a capitated rate for each beneficiary, re-
gardless of the amount of services that the beneficiary actually
uses. While the MCO may receive a higher rate for children with
significant disabilities than for healthy children, medical care for
children with chronic health conditions is exponentially more cost-
ly. Thus, the system encourages MCOs to conserve resources,
whether when making coverage determinations or when affirma-
tively gathering information that might support decisions to
103
provide coverage.
Information from treating physicians is especially helpful when
evaluating these cases, however. MCO medical directors tend to
have general practice backgrounds or backgrounds in medical spe-
cialties that are not particularly relevant to children with
disabilities, such as emergency room care. They often are
104
unfamiliar with the relatively rare medical conditions, with which
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Chasan-Sloan, supra note 3, at 284.
104. An example of a rare condition is cri-du-chat syndrome, a "chromosomal condi-
tion ... characterized by intellectual disability and delayed development, small head size
(microcephaly), low birth weight, and weak muscle tone (hypotonia) in infancy." Cri-du-chat
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children with disabilities can present, and therefore are not famil-
iar with the resultant care and treatment needs. Because of their
lack of specialty qualifications, MCO medical providers sometimes
misinterpret medical and school reports.o
Another information problem with administrative hearings can
arise when MCOs fail to adequately explain their decisions. The
constitutionally-required notice that the MCO must provide when
denying services is intended to avoid this problem. As part of the
Goldberg v. Kelly procedural due process requirement, this notice
must state the agency's action, the reason(s) for the action, the le-
gal citation that supports the determination, and the right to
request a hearing.' 6 One district court has described the "mini-
mum" that agencies must do to meet due process requirements as
including an "explan [ation], in terms comprehensible to the
claimant ... [as to] why the agency is taking this action."'
However, some or all of the required elements, particularly the
legal citation and the explanation, are frequently missing from the
notices. Sometimes "reasons" are based on inaccurate accounts of
the facts. In one representative case, for example, a notice denied
an augmentative communication device to a teenager with mental
retardation who wandered away from her yard and was unable to
provide her address or phone number to passersby. The MCO's
notice stated only that she "is able to express basic skills presently
and is able to express her needs verbally," without any supporting
reasons or further explanation as to why the MCO reached this
decision. 0 ' It is hard to imagine how the ability to communicate
one's address and phone number qualifies as anything other than
a basic communication skill.
Defective notices are problematic because they do not allow
Medicaid recipients to make an informed decision about whether
syndanne, GENETIcs HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition=criduchatsyndrome
(last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
105. For example, in one case I handled, the medical director testified that a prescrip-
tion medication used to help control a child with spina bifida's neurogenic bladder was for
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (a diagnosis that the child did not actually have). In
another case, a nurse case manager testified that a notation of "HOH" in a physical therapy
report meant that the child engaged in tasks while holding his hands in the air over his
head, instead of understanding that the therapist was indicating that the child required
"hand over hand assistance" to complete tasks. See generally, J.R., DCIS No. 5005010054, at
*15, Higgins, H.O. (Del. Dep't of Health and Soc. Serv's, Div. of Medicaid and Medical Assis-
tance Aug. 21, 2006).
106. 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.205(d), 210 (2009).
107. Ortiz v. Eichler, 616 F. Supp. 1046, 1061 (D. Del. 1985), affd, 794 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.
1986).




an appeal is meritorious, nor do they enable recipients to ade-
quately prepare for the arguments to be raised at the hearing.'"
The information deficit in the administrative hearing context is
exacerbated because little to no formal discovery is permitted. The
Medicaid beneficiary has the right to request a copy of her MCO
file as well as any regulatory or policy material cited in the notice."o
However, if the defective notice fails to cite any authority, this right
is of little use. Further, there is no standard definition as to what
constitutes a Medicaid beneficiary's file. One MCO will produce an
exhaustive record of all service requests and denials throughout
the beneficiary's enrollment. Another MCO will turn over infor-
mation related only to the denial at issue, and even then, that in-
information will not include documents purportedly relied upon
in support of the determination."'
Some states require the MCO to prepare a "fair hearing sum-
mary," which includes a synopsis of the MCO's position, the
supporting reasons, and a list of witnesses."' However, while filings
can provide some insightful information, they often include the
same deficiencies as the original denial notice. Otherwise, there is
usually no opportunity to take depositions or issue interrogatories,
make requests for admission, or make requests for production of
other documents. Such tools would be useful for gathering addi-
tional information, narrowing the issues, and, particularly where
doctors' schedules may conflict with hearings, memorializing tes-
timony.
Another aspect of the information problem in these appeals
stems from the documentation typically maintained by the pre-
scribing physicians. First, doctors write in medical terms, which
often do not track the legal language of the applicable medical ne-
cessity standard. Failing to speak in terms consistent with the
statutory or regulatory standard can be fatal to an appeal. Second,
submitting letters of medical necessity into evidence at a hearing in
the absence of a live witness can present hearsay problems."
109. Ortiz, 616 F. Supp. at 1062 ("This detailed information is needed to enable claim-
ants to understand what the agency has decided, so that they may assess the correctness of
the agency's decision, make an informed decision as to whether to appeal, and be prepared
for the issues to be addressed at the hearing.").
110. See 42 C.F.R. § 438.406(b) (3) (2009) (providing beneficiary the right "to examine
the enrollee's case file, including medical records, and any other documents and records
considered during the appeals process").
111. Often this information consists of webpage printouts, the dates on which, in my
experience, frequently and problematically post-date the decision to deny.
112. See, e.g., 16 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 5312 (2009).
113. See, e.g., 16 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 5600 (stating that hearsay evidence is not admissi-
ble unless it meets one of the exceptions provided in the same section); § 5601 ("Findings of
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Finally, the appeals process does not afford doctors the oppor-
tunity to formally respond to the reasons raised in the denial
notice. MCOs often argue that any information generated after the
denial date is irrelevant because it is "new." They take the position
that the hearing is a determination about whether the MCO's de-
nial was reasonable based upon the information it had at the time,
instead of whether the service is in fact medically necessary for the
beneficiary, based on all available information. 1 4 For all of these
reasons, the Medicaid administrative hearing process presents mul-
tiple barriers to beneficiaries -who want to challenge service
denials.
111. THE MEDICAL-LEGAL PARTNERSHIP MODEL FOR THE
DELIVERY OF CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES
Under the traditional civil legal services delivery model, a Medi-
caid recipient typically finds a lawyer independent from her
relationship with the prescribing doctor. Most such lawyers work
for civil legal aid or legal services programs. Medicaid denial notic-
es often contain contact information for the local legal services
program, and some clients initiate a call to request legal assis-
tance."5 Other clients are referred by a social worker or other
service provider who is familiar with the legal services office.
The lawyer is then charged with contacting the prescribing doc-
tor to obtain medical records and, ideally, a brief interview to
determine the merits of the case. Thus, collaborations between the
medical and legal fields often arise on an ad hoc basis, necessitated
by the demands of a particular service denial, as in Sonya's case.
However, during the last seventeen years, some lawyers and doctors
are consciously working together to establish formal medical-legal
fact must be supported by at least some evidence which is admissible in a court of law."). For
an example of a possible solution to the hearsay problem, see DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 807
(providing an exception to the hearsay rule).
114. Contrast this with the Supplemental Security Income and the Social Security Disa-
bility Insurance appellate processes wherein the administrative records remain open until
the time of the administrative hearing. See alsojuras v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 457 A.2d 1020,
1022 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (concluding that fairness required-that-petitioner's failure to
introduce evidence at an earlier hearing did not constitute a waiver of right to introduce
evidence at a later stage of the proceedings); Gilliard v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 477 A.2d 614,
616 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (holding that beneficiary must be allowed to fully present his
case for continued eligibility for public assistance benefits even though he failed to intro-
duce evidence he had in his possession at an earlier stage of the proceedings).
115. This is not to suggest that most people who are denied Medicaid services obtain
legal representation or appeal the denial.
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partnerships as a new means of delivering services to people who
are disadvantaged by poverty and/or disability.
A. History and Development of Medical-Legal Partnerships
The delivery of legal services in a medical-legal partnership
model has its roots in work that began in Boston, Massachusetts. In
the late 1980s, Gary Bellow, one of the pioneers in the contempo-
rary legal services movement and founder of Harvard Law School's
first clinical program, initiated a project involving "legal
check-ups"'16 at the Brigham and Women's Hospital ambulatory
care waiting room."7Just as doctors systematically review each body
system during a routine physical, lawyers assess the client's profile
for potential eligibility for various public benefits. The Brigham
and Women's project work was interdisciplinary, with doctors, law-
yers, non-lawyer advocates, and law, medical, and social work
students participating. 18
Gary's work, along with that of his wife and colleague Jeanne
Charn," arose in response to several problems that they observed:
many clients received medical care but not the public benefits to
which they were legally entitled; legal advocates faced hurdles in
securing medical records and opinion letters from treating physi-
cians as evidence in public benefits cases; and lawyers alone were
unable to meet the great need for advocacy on behalf of clients in
the public benefits system.o2 0 The strategy was twofold: "legal check-
ups" were performed in the hospital waiting room to screen pa-
tients for public benefits eligibility, and doctors and other medical
staff were trained in how to more effectively advocate on behalf of
their patients-for example, by contacting the welfare office or a
utility company to remedy problems.'2 1 Thus, a transformation in
the delivery of legal services-to a model that is proactive and col-
laborative, rather than reactionary and adversarial-began.
116. See Jeffrey Selbin & Mark Del Monte, A Waiting Room of Their Own: The Family Care
Network as a Modelfor Providing Gender-Specific Legal Services to Women with HIV, 5 DUKE J. GEN-
DER L. & POL'Y 103, 124 (1998) (describing the use of the "legal check-up" model in a
medical-legal partnership, in which lawyers ask "explicit questions about the client's poten-
tial legal needs.").
117. I was fortunate enough to have been a student of Gary's and to have worked with
him as a clinical student at the Community Law Center in Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts.
118. See Gary Bellow & Jeanne Charn, Paths Not Yet Taken: Some Comments on Feldman's
Critique of Legal Services Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 1633, 1659 (1995).
119. I have also had the privilege of working with Jeanne Charn at the Community Law
Center, where I completed an independent clinical project under her supervision.
120. Bellow & Charn, supra note 118, at 1659.
121. Id. at 1659-60.
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Medical-legal partnerships in their current form have their gen-
esis in the work of Dr. Barry Zuckerman. Dr. Zuckerman, a
physician at Boston Medical Center, experienced the frustration of
prescribing appropriate medical treatment in the hospital for a
child's asthma exacerbation, only to have the improvement be
short-lived after the child returned home to a moldy apartment
that triggered yet another episode. In 1993, he took the unprece-
dented step of hiring a lawyer to remedy those substandard
housing conditions, resulting in a subsequent improvement in the
child's health." Thus the predecessor to what is now the National
Center for Medical-Legal Partnership was born. Today, nine lawyers
and four paralegals work as part of the medical teams at Boston
Medical Center,'2 ' and a "national network [that] now includes
over eighty partnerships serving over 180 health care sites in thirty-
six states . . . serv[ing] over 10,000 clients in 2008."l124
The medical-legal partnership model "integrate [s] lawyers di-
rectly into the healthcare system and make [s] attorneys part of the
medical team ... so that when a doctor, nurse, or social worker
sees a patient whose basic needs are not being met, that medical
provider can simply send the child's family to the lawyer working
next door."'2  The model recognizes the value of specialist
consultations and understands that health can be improved by
non-medical solutions. Just as a doctor would refer a patient to a
cardiologist for a heart problem, the patient is referred to a lawyer
when the doctor encounters an issue appropriate for legal exper-
tise. In this setting, lawyers "train and back up front-line clinicians
to develop their triage instincts for the social determinants of
health, and dispense small 'doses' of legal information and consul-
tation to a broad population of front-line staff."126
This paradigm utilizes a "three-pronged strategy," including
training and education of healthcare staff, direct legal assistance to
122. Schulman et al., supra note 59, at 758; see alsoJane R. Wettach, The Law School Clinic
as a Partner in a Medical-Legal Partnership, 75 TENN. L. REv. 305, 306-07 (2008) (describing
another case where an attorney was successfully involved in the work of the partnership);
Zuckerman et al., supra note 12 (discussing how lawyers can contribute to the work of pedia-
tricians).
123. Staff MED.-LEGAL PARTNERSHIP BOSTON, http://www.mlpboston.org/about-
us/staff (last visited Apr. 2, 2011).
124. Schulman et al., supra note 59, at 763; see also Selbin & Del Monte, supra note 116,
at 120-23 (describing Berkeley Community Law Center's HIV/AIDS Law Project, which
provides legal services to patients at three primary health care provider sites).
125. Lawton et al., supra note 19, at 431.
126. Schulman et al., supra note 59, at 772.
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patients, and systemic advocacy.2 7 The medical-legal partnership
model differs from the traditional delivery of civil legal services, in
which lawyers are less prepared to act proactively because clients'
problems are too far advanced by the time they obtain a lawyer. In
a medical-legal partnership, lawyers engage in "preventive legal
care"28 by "offering services to persons who are not yet in crisis,
who may not yet have critical or emergent legal needs, with the ex-
press aim of educating them about their rights and encouraging
them to pursue [legal] treatment."'2 9 For Sonya, this may have
meant the difference between submitting a well-documented letter
of medical necessity along with her doctor's original prescription
and litigating the case months later at an adversarial hearing.
Thus, sites in the National Center for MLP network view clients
holistically by seeking to diagnose and treat the social determinants
of health. Simply put, "many health conditions [can be traced] to
social factors that are potentially remediable by fair enforcement of
existing laws and regulations. "'" For low-income patients, 3 ' key ar-
eas of basic need include housing, utilities, and homelessness,
hunger and nutrition, employment and income, health insurance,
immigrant status, childcare and parenting support, disability, edu-
cation, and domestic or community violence, all of which can
affect health and well-being.13
127. Lawton et al., supra note 19, at 431; see also Wettach, supra note 122, at 308-09
(demonstrating, through a real-life example, the multiple ways a medical-legal partnership
can assist persons with disabilities).
128. See Schulman et al., supra note 59, at 759 ("As it turns out, legal advocacy is the best
medicine for the social determinants of health. For lawyers, it presented an opportunity to
change the way legal services are typically delivered, away from crisis-generated litigation
toward preventive law." (internal citation omitted)); Selbin & Del Monte, supra note 116, at
125-26 (describing the "'early intervention' model of service provision," in which clients'
legal needs are identified "irrespective of whether a formal legal proceeding is underway"
with the result that "many incipient legal problems [are prevented] from becoming more
difficult, time-consuming, and stressful for the client and the [medical-legal services provid-
er] to resolve").
129. Schulman et al., supra note 59, at 776.
130. Lawton et al., supra note 19, at 426-27.
131. While the client profiles in this Article are drawn from work on behalf of people
with disabilities, the target population of the National Center for Medical-Legal Partnership
has generally been people with low incomes. In reality, the two groups overlap significantly.
See, e.g., Office on Disability-Prevalence and Impact Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/od/about/fact,_sheets/prevalenceandimpacthtml (last visited
Apr. 2, 2011) ("According to a 1997 U.S. Bureau of the Census report-The poverty rate
among the population 25-to-64 years old with no disability was 8 percent, compared with 10
percent for people with a nonsevere disability and 28 percent for people with a severe disa-
bility.").
132. Lawton et al., supra note 19, at 424, Figure 21.3.
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B. Existing Medical-Legal Partnership Scholarship
Existing scholarship about medical-legal partnerships centers
around two areas. First, partnership sites are collecting data to
learn more about their work. This takes the form of legal needs
assessments, which demonstrate the extent of unmet legal needs
among patients, as well as outcome measures that strive to docu-
ment the impact that access to legal services has on patient health.
Second, scholars from partnership sites are writing about how the
model is changing and informing the work of legal services law-
yers.13 3 These articles examine issues surrounding interdisciplinary
work and help to reframe the provision of legal services from a re-
active to a preventive medicine model.
1. Unmet Legal Needs and Impact on Patient Health
Studies of partnership patients consistently reveal that a medical
setting is a prime area to identify people with unmet legal needs
and, importantly, to link those people with lawyers. For example,
data from the National Center for MLP's 2007 study "to assess the
legal needs of a hospital-based population" demonstrate that
"[o]ver 94% of families reported facing or experiencing at least
one concern within the last month; 67% reported experiencing
concerns related to at least five of the 12 basic needs" surveyed.'"
Gary Bellow's Medical-Legal Services Project found in its first
eighteen months of operation that over 90% of patients had "'le-
gal problems;' that is, problems potentially resolvable or
improvable with the intervention of a person trained in the law."
35
Similarly, a needs assessment of patients conducted by Widener
University School of Law students, in conjunction with a local legal
services provider in a fledgling MLP, discovered unmet legal
needs.3 6 The survey was conducted at Westside Health, a federally
qualified health center.in Wilmington, Delaware.13 7 Of the sixty-two
patients surveyed, twenty-six reported problems with public bene-
fits, especially Medicaid and Medicare, and twenty-one reported
133. See, e.g., Lawton et al., supra note 19; Schulman et al., supra note 59.
134. Schulman et al., supra note 59, at 765-66.
135. Bellow & Charn, supra note 118, at 1660.
136. See COMMUNITY LEGAL AID SOCIETY, INC., MEDICAL LEGAL FAMILY ADVOCACY
PROGRAM NEEDS ASSESSMENT: 2007 SURVEY RESULTs 5 (2007) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("[A] gap exists between the need for legal assistance . . .
and the availability of affordable legal assistance for these participants and their families.").
137. Id. at 1.
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problems with housing." Significantly, only two of these patients
reported consulting an attorney about their legal problems, an
illustration of the 'justice gap."'39 Westside patients also reported
experiencing problems with abuse and disability-related discrimi-
nation and access to services."o None of the surveyed patients con-
consulted with an attorney in these areas.14 1 The survey concluded
that a disconnect exists between Westside Health patients' need for
legal assistance and the availability of affordable legal assistance."'
The medical-legal partnership model seeks to bridge this gap
and is grounded in the belief that addressing patients' legal needs
improves patient health: "there is more involved in maintaining
good health than what a doctor alone is able to provide, and a
check-up or a chronic care visit has to include making sure pa-
tients' basic needs are met."43 This emerging area of research for
medical-legal partnerships involves documenting the linkage be-
tween addressing patients' unmet legal needs and improving
patient health. The National Center for MLP posits:
The inability to access legal services for guidance with regard
to healthcare coverage or benefits, and for basic needs such as
habitable housing and adequate nutrition, can prevent vul-
nerable individuals from effectively managing their illnesses.
This can lead to lack of compliance with their course of
treatment, which negatively affects their quality of life.'"
The ability to document and confirm this hypothesis presents an
important source of support for the maintenance and expansion of
the partnerships.
Early on, Gary Bellow's Medical-Legal Services Project found
that while "[d]ocumenting the health effects of the project
remains problematic ... some surprising outcomes have already
emerged."4 5 These included a "statistically significant" drop in
hypertension and "dramatic" health improvements in asthma pa-
tients whose substandard housing conditions were remedied and
in patients whose stress levels were reduced after obtaining disabil-
ity benefits to meet their basic needs."'6 While there are "many
138. Id. at 3-4.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 4.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 5.
143. Schulman et al., supra note 59, at 763.
144. Id. at 767.
145. Bellow & Charn, supra note 118, at 1663.
146. Id.
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explanations for these outcomes ... they do suggest potentially
important 'secondary' results from projects of this nature."
Some recent efforts illustrate the continuation of this type of
research. For example, a study evaluating the effectiveness of
medical-legal partnerships in New York City found that 78% of
cancer patients surveyed stated that their health condition
brought about legal problems. '4 Another New York City study
concluded that "patients who received legal intervention had sig-
nificant improvements in asthma severity, cortico-steroid usage
courses, and reduced emergency room visits as compared to the
group of patients who did not receive legal intervention." 49 A re-
cent study in California demonstrated that MLPs "increase [d]
access to legal and social services and decrease [d] barriers to
health care . . . [including] increased access to food and income
supports.,9 0 Significantly, two-thirds of families surveyed reported
improved child health and well-being as a result of medical-legal
partnership services.'5 ' This service delivery model thus has the
demonstrated potential to improve both legal and medical out-
comes.
2. Transforming Legal Services to an Interdisciplinary
Preventive Care Model
Medical-legal partnerships represent a new lens through which
to view the advocacy required for clients like Sonya. The National
Center for MLP model for the delivery of legal services draws on
the healthcare field's emphasis on preventive care and carries this
analogy over into the legal services realm. Under this new model:
Doctors, because of their position of trust, are well-positioned
to screen patients through regular contact .... Lawyers are
able to bring a new type of expertise to the healthcare setting,
so patients will be treated more holistically than in a typical
medical exam room and they will be seen earlier than in a
traditional legal services office. 5 2
147. Id.
148. Schulman et al., supra note 59, at 768.
149. Id. at 769.
150. Dana Weintraub et al., Pilot Study of Medical-Legal Partnership to Address Social and Le-
gal Needs of Patients, 21 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 157, 165 (2010).
151. Id. at 164.
152. Schulman et al., supra note 59, at 759-60.
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The National Center for MLP approach critiques the traditional
"battlefield triage model,"53 where lawyers for poor people are re-
active and move from crisis to crisis, and "posits that greater
investment in preventive [legal] care today, even at the cost of
abandoning some crisis intervention today, is warranted by the
long-term benefits achieved by the prevention efforts."' 4
The need for lawyers to work in an interdisciplinary context that
is proactive and collaborative is increasing, particularly at the inter-
section of law and medicine.'5 In the words of Ed Sparer, "[tlhe
law ... cannot be understood without grasping the way legal and
social institutions in these areas interact with life."' Legal educa-
tion's tendency to divide "the theoretical and practical, and the
cognitive and affective consciousness, is one reason why law schools
do not come close to adequate scrutiny of our complex institu-
tions."'5 7 At the same time, "[1]awyers and physicians often have
tense relationships. Members of the 2 [sic] professions frequently
disagree about the definition of appropriate evidence, the value of
adversarial proceedings, and the social utility of due process."'
The MLP model not only offers a means of remedying these dis-
connects but also helps each profession better accomplish its goals.
Cases like Sonya's enable lawyers and doctors to work together
on a more cooperative and collaborative venture. While Sonya's
lawyer and doctor were able to work together informally, taking the
next step of "[a]nchoring" legal services in the medical context
enables doctors to see lawyers as part of a helping profession, work-
ing to improve patient health, rather than being "overly focused"
on limiting liability and preventing malpractice.'5 ' Thus, medical-
legal partnerships present the opportunity to harness the benefits
153. Id. at 744.
154. Id. at 778; see also Selbin and Del Monte, supra note 116, at 118 ("Women with HIV
often need services before a problem they are experiencing has progressed to the point
where an attorney will recognize it as a 'legal' one.").
155. See, e.g., Wettach, supra note 122, at 310 ("Exposure to a law practice that is inten-
tionally interdisciplinary [such as a medical-legal partnership focused on education issues]
gives students an opportunity to work directly with other [non-legal] professionals, which
they likely will need to do frequently during their legal careers.").
156. David F. Chavkin, Training the Ed Sparers of Tomorrow: Integrating Health Law Theory
and Practice, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 303, 319 (1994) (quoting Edward V. Sparer, The Responsibility
of Law Teachers, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 602, 604 (1978), and emphasizing the limitations inherent
in teaching subjects such as health care law solely in the classroom without an experiential
learning component) (internal quotations omitted).
157. Id.
158. Schulman et al., supra note 59, at 733 n.9 (quoting Daniel M. Fox, The Professions of
Public Health, 91 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 1362, 1363 (2001)) (internal quotations omitted).
159. Lawton et al., supra note 19, at 431.
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of interdisciplinary work on behalf of common clients/patients by
fostering collaboration.
An interdisciplinary approach also benefits the medical part-
ners. "[P]ediatricians and other health care providers often find
themselves in the difficult situation of recognizing the effect of so-
cial factors on the health of their vulnerable young patients, while
feeling helpless to address them."'" Just as a family practice doctor
would consult with an orthopedist to treat Sonya's cerebral palsy,
there is a role for a legal advocate as a member of her medical care
team. In the medical-legal partnership model, the legal specialist is
available to consult on possible solutions to the problems identi-
fied by medical staff.
As Sonya's case demonstrates, "[1]awyers can provide specialized
treatment for rights violations and can take the appropriate legal
steps to hold agencies, landlords, schools, and others accountable
on behalf of families."'' Such an approach reflects the real-world
experiences of clients/patients: "The practices of medicine and
law, particularly for low-income families, cannot exist separate from
one another. We must recognize the correlations between hunger,
housing and health as well as the negative impact that a delay in
access to the legal system can have on a patient's well-being."'6
For the insights from an interdisciplinary approach to be effec-
tive, practitioners in other disciplines must act as advocates, in
addition to acting as fact witnesses. The medical-legal partnership
model recognizes that healthcare providers are especially well posi-
tioned to serve in this role.
When evaluating and treating patients, health care profes-
sionals frequently identify how inadequate food, housing, and
community and individual safety; poor access to basic medica-
tions such as vaccines; or other unmet basic needs contribute
solely or in part to preventable medical illness and poor
health. Physicians are thus in a unique position to set in mo-
tion advocacy that ensures that the laws and policies
protecting health are effectively implemented.
160. Schulman etal., supra note 59, at 759.
161. Lawton et al., supra note 19, at 432.
162. Schulman et al., supra note 59, at 763; see also Lawton et al., supra note 19, at 428
("[Wihen doctors and lawyers work together, they leverage the combined expertise of both
professions to most effectively disrupt the links between child poverty and its adverse health
outcomes.").
163. Schulman et al., supra note 59, at 771.
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Medical-legal partnerships provide the support and expertise nec-
essary to foster successful legal and non-legal advocacy to the
benefit of clients and patients.
IV. MEDICAID AUGMENTATIVE COMMUNICATION DEVICE APPEALS IN
THE CONTEXT OF THE MEDICAL-LEGAL PARTNERSHIP MODEL
Situating cases like the opening vignette in a medical-legal part-
nership model overcomes the barriers posed by disincentives to
appeal, inequities in the hearing process, and misinformation.
A. Disincentives to Appeal
Several aspects of the medical-legal partnership model present
the potential to alleviate the appeal disincentives commonly expe-
rienced by Medicaid beneficiaries and their families. First, the
partnership model is built around a team approach. It is not just
the Medicaid beneficiary against the adversary, or even the Medi-
caid beneficiary and her lawyer. Instead, the patient and lawyer are
supported by the entire medical team who can bring to bear medi-
cal evidence and information to champion the case. Having such
backing encourages families to enter into the often-complicated
Medicaid appeals process, in the midst of the many other demands
on their time and energy associated with parenting a child with a
significant disability. Despite the merits of their service request,
Medicaid beneficiaries are less likely to pursue an appeal and less
likely to succeed if they are navigating the system alone.
Moreover, the model's "preventive law" approach allows issues to
be referred for legal assistance before the crisis stage is reached,
potentially reducing family stress. As noted above, in cases like
Sonya's, a well-written and documented letter of medical necessity
that directly responds to the applicable legal standard can lead to
an initial approval instead of a denial notice.
Medical-legal partnerships also can teach clients about potential
legal solutions to the problems they face. In spite of the array of
social and income supports available, bureaucratic or arbitrary
program administration "too often results in illegal denials or lack
of access to benefits and services, which leads to preventable poor
health outcomes."m6 Moreover, many patients do not identify the
164. Lawton et al., supra note 19, at 427 (internal citations omitted).
SUMMER 2011] 893
University of Michigan journal of Law Reform
problems they are experiencing as legal problems1'5 and do not
realize that they have important rights that they can seek to en-
force.
Along these lines, medical-legal partnerships present a valuable
opportunity to reach clients who otherwise might not access a law-
yer. For example, in the Medicaid context, clients may feel too
overwhelmed, unsophisticated, or intimidated to access the appeal
system on their own. One patient's mother, for example, had cog-
nitive disabilities that made it difficult for her to advocate for her
son by herself. The speech-language pathologist involved in the
case had firsthand knowledge of the denial and was able to identify
the problem as one meriting legal assistance. An existing medical-
legal partnership would serve to facilitate and formalize this pro-
cess, rather than relying on the vagrancies of ad hoc connections.
Further, medical-legal partnerships foster a culture of advocacy
among the patients who are served. A study at Boston Medical
Center found that "MLP Boston patient-families felt more empow-
ered to access the services they needed than patient-families at
other health centers. Overall, MLP Boston patient-families were
better, more skilled advocates.""' Specifically, "MLP Boston patient-
families were more likely to get what they needed with less work.
[They] employed more effective strategies to solve legal problems
than patient-families seen at other health centers, such as calling
Boston's housing code enforcement agency services versus using
Raid to handle a cockroach infestation."'6 Thus, there is some evi-
dence that medical-legal partnerships not only make a difference
in the context of the particular case that gives rise to a legal refer-
ral, but also that the experience of working with a seasoned
advocate helps to foster clients' own advocacy skills for the future.
B. Unfair Hearings
Many of the inequities Medicaid beneficiaries experience in the
appeals process can be remedied by access to a lawyer. A lawyer is
uniquely positioned to analyze the complex law that applies to a
service request. A lawyer also assists the Medicaid beneficiary in
navigating the complex appeals process.
165. See, e.g., Selbin & Del Monte, supra note 116, at 117-18 (noting that HIV-infected
women often do not identify their needs, such as insufficient income, substandard housing,
inadequate access to health care, and uncertain financial and family planning as "at least
partly 'legal' in nature").




In addition to improving patient access to legal aid lawyers,
some medical-legal partnerships also have worked to increase the
overall supply of lawyers available to advocate on behalf of poor
and/or disabled clients. Medical-legal partnerships are involved
with private law firms' pro bono efforts, as firms "adopt" health cen-
ters and their patients.'" Medical-legal partnerships located in law
school clinics enable student attorneys to represent patients and,
while doing so, "hope to inculcate some sense of social responsibil-
ity in future lawyers to [continue to] represent the
underrepresented." 6 9
The other major source of inequity in the appeals process is
Medicaid beneficiaries' lack of access to doctors to participate as
witnesses in hearings. This is particularly troubling given the law's
deference to a treating physician's professional opinion. In the
augmentative communication context, a federal district court has
endorsed the proposition that the "'determination of medical ne-
cessity must rest with the individual recipient's physician and not
with clerical personnel or governmental officials."" 0 Hunter v. Chil-
es involved the claims of both an adult and a pediatric Medicaid
beneficiary for augmentative communication device coverage. The
plaintiffs were "unable to communicate either verbally or with
hand gestures."' The court endorsed plaintiffs' treating profes-
sionals' recommendation that augmentative communication
devices were "the only speech-language pathology treatment
methodology that will allow the Plaintiffs to have effective expres-
sive communication .... [This determination was] based, in part,
on the lack of success prior speech language pathology services
have had in allowing the plaintiffs to produce speech organical-
ly.""' Not surprisingly, the medical testimony in support of the
plaintiffs was crucial to their success.
168. See "Adopt-a-Health-Center" Proposal Letter from Medical-Legal Partnership to
Unnamed Law Firm (2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(describing National Center for MLP's partnership with private law firms which have adopt-
ed community health centers to conduct intake and handle cases on behalf of patients).
169. Chavkin, supra note 156, at 304.
170. Hunter v. Chiles, 944 F. Supp. 914, 922 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (quoting Pinneke v.
Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1980)). Deference to the treating provider in Medicaid
medical necessity determinations is not limited to the augmentative communication device
context. See S. REP. No. 89-404 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.CA.N. 1943, 1986 ("[T]he
physician is to be the key figure in determining utilization of health services ... it is a physi-
cian who is to decide upon admission to a hospital, order tests, drugs and treatments. . . .");
see also Collins v. Hamilton, 349 F.3d 371, 376 n.8 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[A] state's discretion to
exclude services deemed 'medically necessary' by an EPSDT provider has been circum-
scribed by the express mandate of the statute.").
171. Hunter, 944F. Supp. at 916.
172. Id. at 922 (internal citations omitted).
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A common institutional barrier to advocacy arises when doc-
tors, who already face overburdened schedules, do not prioritize
making time for the "non-medical" work that advocacy in the le-
gal realm entails. Integrating lawyers into the healthcare team
can save time in the long run because patients can access legal
consultations before problems become crises. Identifying legal
issues in a doctor's office instead of a lawyer's office creates effi-
ciencies in securing the records and supporting opinions that the
lawyers need to prove the case and that the doctors are uniquely
suited and otherwise may be hesitant to provide, without an up-
close understanding of the lawyer's work.' 3 Effective advocacy is
enhanced because the "partnership gives the [legal advocate]
much easier access to the doctor, who can elaborate as needed on
the condition, administer required tests, or make important nota-
tions in the chart.",1 4 For example, Gary Bellow's Medical-Legal
Services Project found that in the first eighteen months of the
project, "[a]ccess to [medical] records [has] improved. Doctors'
letters to the social security administration are longer, better writ-
ten, and more cognizant of the appropriate legal standard."1 7
Medical providers' desire and skill to advocate on behalf of pa-
tients may not be enough if there are institutional impediments,
actual or perceived, to such advocacy. The establishment of a for-
mal medical-legal partnership at a healthcare center demonstrates
that the medical partner institution recognizes that legal advocacy
can benefit patients' health and values such work. One such insti-
tutional barrier is the warning bells that often sound whenever
there is talk of lawyers being involved in a case, as doctors (and
their lawyers) worry about malpractice liability. As stated above,
medical-legal partnerships create opportunities for doctors and
lawyers to interact as collaborators rather than adversaries. The
assent of the healthcare center's general counsel is a key step in
establishing a formal partnership and sends the message that this
type of legal advocacy on behalf of patients is permitted and val-
ued. Inviting lawyers into medical centers sends a message that can
counter popular perceptions about lawyers, with good results for
patients. Further, a medical-legal partnership that involves a law
school clinic "provides an opportunity for the law school to show
the community-particularly the medical community-that it is
training its students to be compassionate and caring professionals
173. See Schulman et al., supra note 59, at 771-72 (elaborating on how the partnership
might work).
174. Wettach, supra note 122, at 310.
175. Bellow & Charn, supra note 118, at 1662.
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(not just malpractice attorneys!)."' All these efforts have incre-
mental positive effects in improving service delivery to clients.
C. Misinformation
One of the most obvious benefits offered by medical-legal part-
nerships is the infusion of viewpoints from non-legal disciplines
that can shape and strengthen a case. In the augmentative com-
munication context, the work of physicians and speech-language
pathologists helps lawyers to better understand and give meaning
to the entitlements and standards contained in the Medicaid stat-
ute and regulations.1 7 7 While advocating on behalf of clients is
intrinsic to a lawyer's work, 17 this role may not be comfortable or
familiar for medical professionals. Gary Bellow's Medical-Legal
Services Project found that " [s]uccessful intervention [on behalf of
patients] requires advocacy (not simply advice or assistance) most
effectively provided by staff trained on-the-job for some significant
period of time."
The medical-legal partnership model bridges this gap by ena-
bling the lawyer and the doctor to understand what work is
necessary to achieve the client's goals and how to best accomplish
this end in light of the tools and information available in each dis-
cipline. For example, the legal advocate in a medical-legal
partnership "can help the doctor understand what specific
findings, test results, or other conclusions must be in the records to
meet the legal standards.",,8 o
Cases can be won or lost depending upon the effectiveness of
advocacy efforts by non-lawyers. For example, in the augmentative
communication context, affidavits from a Medicaid beneficiary's
treating physician and speech pathologist were crucial to establish-
ing that an "electronic speech device [was] a necessary and
176. Wettach, supra note 122, at 313.
177. See Selbin & Del Monte, supra note 116, at 127 (describing advantages of multidis-
ciplinary service integration model in legal claims for Medicaid, Supplemental Security
Income disability benefits, and standby guardianship cases).
178. Effective advocacy may not come naturally to law students, either, and medical-
legal partnerships housed in law school clinics can be an effective means of achieving this
pedagogical goal. See Chavkin, supra note 156, at 326-27 (noting that experiential learning
enables "students [to] personally feel the injustices experienced by the client and develop
the special sense of urgency in addressing the client's problem that goes far beyond the
minimum levels of ethical diligent representation"); see generally Wettach, supra note 122
(outlining reasons for law school clinics to participate in medical-legal partnerships).
179. Bellow & Charn, supra note 118, at 1661.
180. Wettach, supra note 122, at 311.
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reasonable form of treatment."'. During the course of the litiga-
tion in Meyers v. Reagan, the state reversed its initial denial and
offered to provide the original augmentative communication de-
vice in question. However, after the complaint was filed, a more
expensive device with additional features came on the market, and
Meyers amended her complaint to seek that device. 83 After deter-
mining that Meyers was eligible for augmentative communication
under the Medicaid program, the Court remanded for a hearing
about which device was more appropriate for her needs.84 Thus,
effective participation by Meyers' medical professionals was essen-
tial to both satisfying the legal standard to enforce her legal right
to Medicaid coverage of augmentative communication in general
and to ultimately realizing that right by obtaining the specific de-
vice most appropriate for her needs.
Along the same lines, the court in Lagowski v. Whalen 8 5 focused
on the testimony of the healthcare providers in that case. Essential
to the reversal of the state's denial of Medicaid coverage of aug-
mentative communication was the uncontroverted testimony of a
speech-language pathologist who explained that the recommended
device would enable the recipient to directly select vocabulary us-
ing only one hand or finger and was otherwise more appropriate
for his needs than less costly alternatives asserted by the state.
The recipient also presented the testimony of a representative
from his residential facility who opined that the augmentative
communication device would "enhance [his] overall quality of life
and would enable the staff 'to more efficiently meet [petitioner's]
needs as it would give [petitioner] the ability to express him-
self.' "017
It is important to recognize that often the emergence of such ev-
idence in the record is not a matter of happenstance. Two
contributing factors are essential: the lawyer must understand both
the legal elements that must be established in the case and the
non-legal proof of those elements, and the doctor must be com-
fortable acting in an advocacy role by testifying, providing medical
records, and/or writing a letter of medical necessity. Because the
medical-legal partnership model calls for lawyers to be integrated
181. Meyers v. Reagan, 776 F.2d 241, 243 (8th Cir. 1985).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 244.
185. 706 N.Y.S.2d 283 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
186. See Lagowski, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 284. A second speech-language pathologist also testi-




into the patient's healthcare team and often on-site at the
healthcare center, both the lawyer's and the doctor's jobs become
easier in a sense. Each has access to the other and can draw on his
or her respective expertise while at the same time appreciating
more fully how the parameters of another discipline bear on the
case. Such collaboration is valuable to fostering proactive advocacy
efforts as well as in providing interdisciplinary support in crises.
CONCLUSION
Despite the tremendous potential for enhanced autonomy that
augmentative communication devices present for people with dis-
abilities, and the strong legal basis for obtaining funding through
the Medicaid program, securing approval for augmentative com-
munication devices often requires legal advocacy. That advocacy is
strengthened when the perspectives of treating medical profes-
sionals are integrated. While such collaboration can arise on an ad
hoc basis, the establishment of formal medical-legal partnerships
offers several benefits for realizing the right to medically necessary
services under the Medicaid program.
Cases involving access to augmentative communication devices
under the Medicaid Act illustrate the enormous potential present-
ed by lawyers, doctors, and other medical professionals working
together on behalf of their mutual clients/patients. While aug-
mentative communication cases are used as examples, the analysis
in this Article is more generally applicable to all Medicaid medical
necessity appeals as well as a wider array of cases in which a lawyer
must acquire specialized or technical knowledge in a non-legal ar-
ea and work with medical or other professionals to fit the facts,
including the reality of the client's situation and the insights and
observations of another discipline, into the language of the appli-
cable legal standard to achieve the client's goals. These
partnerships offer an innovative way to address a range of prob-
lems that affect health, including Medicaid, other public benefits,
housing, immigration, domestic violence, child support, special
education, disability discrimination, and other areas. Integration of
the different training, skills, and perspectives offered by lawyers
and doctors can be a powerful means of obtaining results to which
clients are legally entitled and that improve patient health and
quality of life.
Some modest refinements may further enhance the adoption of
the medical-legal partnership model for the delivery of civil legal
services. First, while emerging scholarship about medical-legal
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partnerships advocates for a transformation from the traditional
delivery of legal services to a new model of public health legal ser-
vices,'" the benefits of medical-legal partnerships can be realized
even without a wholesale transformation to the preventive care
model. Overburdened legal services agencies may be more willing
to adopt the model if they can see that much of the work they al-
ready are doing falls into the medical-legal paradigm. Informal
working partnerships among lawyers and doctors frequently
emerge out of necessity on a case-by-case basis. Formalizing these
relationships results in better case outcomes from both a medical
and legal perspective as well as efficiencies in the use of limited
time and resources. Problems can be identified earlier and doctors
will know what information should be supplied in the first place,
thereby alleviating the cost and time associated with denials. Medi-
caid beneficiaries and their families can have access to a team of
professionals to support their needs.
Second, at a time of both increasing demand and shrinking
funding for legal services work, the medical-legal partnership
model presents valuable opportunities for increasing both the
overall supply of lawyers and legal services funding. Research that
confirms the beneficial impact of MLP work can be used to sup-
port grant applications from funding sources that may not have
traditionally supported legal work. Finally, in addition to improving
patient health, medical-legal partnerships have been shown to im-
prove the medical providers' bottom lines. One recent study
demonstrated that hospitals receive sixteen dollars in revenue for
every dollar invested in the collaboration.89 Consequently, medical-
legal partnerships are an investment that makes sense, both finan-
cially and as a tool to augment the advocacy of legal services
lawyers.
188. See Schulman et al., supra note 59, at 778 ("The empirical investigation needed to
sustain that argument remains to be completed.").
189. SeeJimmY BOYLE & ADA CHIU, LEGALHEALTH, FINANCIAL IMPACT STUDY OF LE-
GALHEALTH SERVICES TO NEW YORK CITY HOSPITALS 2 (2007) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
900 [VOL. 44:4
